SPENSER'S THEORY OF FRIENDSHIP

BY

CHARLES G. SMITH

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Board of University Studies of the Johns Hopkins University in Conformity with the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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PREFACE

Of all the books in Spenser's *Faerie Queene* perhaps the Fourth has received the least critical investigation. With a few notable exceptions, scholars have considered the Fourth Book chaotic. Two scholars have defended it: Professor John Erskine contends that throughout the book Spenser consistently celebrates friendship as a virtue; Mr. H. Clement Notcutt holds that it has a definite plan and that it is related structurally to the book that precedes and the book that follows. Although my researches have to do with problems chiefly untouched by these and other scholars, I am greatly indebted to them. The studies constituting the present volume had their inception in the hope that further investigation of the Fourth Book might throw additional light on its perplexities.

With the exception of the last chapter, the material in this volume has already been published. The first study, "Spenser's Theory of Friendship," is reprinted from *Publications of the Modern Language Association*, 49 (1934). 490-500; the second, "Spenser's Theory of Friendship: An Elizabethan Commonplace," from *Studies in Philology*, 32 (1935). 158-169; the third, "Sententious Theory in Spenser's Legend of Friendship," from *E L H: A Journal of English Literary History*, 2 (1935). 165-191; the fourth, "The Ethical Allegory of the Two Florimels," from *Studies in Philology*, 31 (1934). 140-151. For permission to reprint these studies I wish to thank the editors of the journals in which they have appeared.

Only a few of my many personal obligations can be recorded here. To Dr. Benjamin Franklin Sledd, Professor of English in Wake Forest College, and to Dr. George Washington Paschal, Professor of Greek in Wake Forest College, I owe the beginning of my interest in literature. My interest in Spenser started under Professor Edwin Greenlaw at the Johns Hopkins University. Without Professor Greenlaw's stimulating criticism and wise counsel this volume could never have been written. It is a pleasure for me to acknowledge my great indebtedness to him. To Professor Raymond Dexter Havens and to Professor

Kemp Malone I wish to express appreciation for friendly encouragement and helpful criticism. My thanks are due Dr. Ray Heffner for reading the proof. For assisting me in numerous ways I desire to record my gratitude to my wife, Dr. Cornelia Marschall Smith.

C. G. S.

The John B. Stetson University,
DeLand, Florida,
September 9, 1935.

I

SPENSER'S THEORY OF FRIENDSHIP

In the first three books of the *Faerie Queene* Spenser is primarily interested in the virtue of the individual as such: his holiness, his temperance, his chastity—the harmony of the whole nature controlled by reason. Beginning with the Fourth Book he turns to a more definite consideration of the individual in relation to other individuals. With his classical background it was reasonable that he should put friendship next. Aristotle had upheld the thesis that all social relationships grow out of friendship, and both Plato and his Neo-Platonic followers had expounded a philosophy essentially consistent with this. The endeavor in this first chapter is to show that in the Fourth Book Spenser conceives of friendship as the operation in the world of man of a principle of cosmic love, a conception which he bases on Lucretius' Hymn to Venus; and that there is a striking correspondence between the concord-discord antithesis in the Fourth Book and the conflict in *Mutabilitie*, a correspondence which not only throws light on the poet's interests in the Fourth Book but which helps to date *Mutabilitie*.

Some of the finest poetry Spenser wrote occurs in the tenth canto of the Fourth Book, and it is there that he perhaps most explicitly sets forth his theory of friendship. The Temple of Venus pictured in that canto occupies a place in the book comparable to the position of the House of Holiness in the First Book or Mercilla's Court of Justice in the Fifth Book. It has been generally held that Spenser translated the Hymn to Venus and included it there merely because of its fine poetic quality. The significance of the relation between Venus and friendship—the alleged theme of the book—has been overlooked, although the relation is apparently organic and therefore allegorically highly important.[1] According to the Hymn, Venus is the mother of love—the harmonizing and unifying

[1] Cf. Laurens Joseph Mills's unpublished Chicago dissertation, *The Renascence Development in England of the Classical Ideas about Friendship* (1925), pp. 271-273. See *Abstracts of Theses*, The Univ. of Chicago, Humanistic Series, 4 (1925-1926). 337-340.

principle in the universe. The first and last stanzas will serve to exemplify this:

> Great *Venus*, Queene of beautie and of grace,
> The ioy of Gods and men, that vnder skie
> Doest fayrest shine, and most adorne thy place,
> That with thy smyling looke doest pacifie
> The raging seas, and makst the stormes to flie;
> Thee goddesse, thee the winds, the clouds doe feare,
> And when thou spredst thy mantle forth on hie,
> The waters play and pleasant lands appeare,
> And heauens laugh, and al the world shews ioyous cheare.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> So all the world by thee at first was made,
> And dayly yet thou doest the same repayre:
> Ne ought on earth that merry is and glad,
> Ne ought on earth that louely is and fayre,
> But thou the same for pleasure didst prepayre.
> Thou art the root of all that ioyous is,
> Great God of men and women, queene of th' ayre,
> Mother of laughter, and welspring of blisse,
> O graunt that of my loue at last I may not misse.
>
> (4. 10. 44, 47)

The whole canto is built around this Hymn, while throughout the book there is an exposition of the work of Venus—"The Queene of beautie, and of loue the mother" (4. 10. 29)—in human society. Lady Concord is the personified abstraction of the poet's conception of this particular function of Venus, and he has therefore closely associated them here in the tenth canto. The choruslike passage describing Lady Concord's rôle furnishes a clue to Spenser's conception:

> *Concord* she cleeped was in common reed,
> Mother of blessed *Peace*, and *Friendship* trew;
> They both her twins, both borne of heauenly seed,
> And she her selfe likewise diuinely grew;
> The which right well her workes diuine did shew:
> For strength, and wealth, and happinesse she lends,
> And strife, and warre, and anger does subdew:
> Of litle much, of foes she maketh frends,
> And to afflicted minds sweet rest and quiet sends.
>
> By her the heauen is in his course contained,
> And all the world in state vnmoued stands,
> As their Almightie maker first ordained.

And bound them with inuiolable bands;
Else would the waters ouerflow the lands,
And fire deuoure the ayre, and hell them quight,
But that she holds them with her blessed hands.
She is the nourse of pleasure and delight,
And vnto *Venus* grace the gate doth open right.[2]
(4. 10. 34-35)

Thus, Spenser conceives of friendship as the operation in the world of man of a harmonizing and unifying cosmic principle. Appended below is a brief account of the allegory of the Fourth Book which will serve to show how pervasive, throughout the book, is this conception and at the same time help to get the legend as a whole before the reader.

The Fourth Book opens with an account of Britomart's friendship for Amoret, rescued by Britomart from the enchantment of Busirane at the end of Book Three. As they journey on together, they meet Blandamour and Paridel with Duessa and Ate. Represented as the incarnation of discord, Ate strives incessantly to undo the work of Concord. Scudamour joins the group, and Ate and Duessa goad him to desperation by telling him that his love Amoret is faithless. Commenting on this canto at the beginning of the second, Spenser calls Discord a firebrand of hell sent into the world to work confusion.

As the group ride on, they meet Sir Ferraugh with the false Florimel, represented as the embodiment of false beauty—one of the attributes of Ate which makes possible her work of promoting discord. Because of their lustful desires and selfish motives, the friendship of Paridel and Blandamour proves false. Urged on by Ate, Paridel becomes jealous of Blandamour and fights with him for the possession of the make-believe Florimel.

The incident of Cambel and Triamond is begun in canto two and extends over into canto four. Agape's three sons—Priamond, Diamond, and Triamond—in turn fight with Cambel for the hand of his sister Canace. When Priamond is killed, his soul unites with Diamond's, and when Diamond is killed, his soul unites with Triamond's. Cambel and Triamond now fight, but since they are equal, neither is able to conquer the other. Triamond's sister Cambina comes into the arena and reconciles them by giving them a magic drink. Spenser here shows that he is primarily interested in portraying the essential unity of love and friendship. He reinforces the friendship of Cambel and Triamond by having Cambel

[2] Closely related to this passage in motive and poetical kinship is a fine chorus in Gascoigne's *Jocasta* (*Complete Works of George Gascoigne*, ed John W. Cunliffe [Cambridge, 1907], 1. 305-307). See pp. 20-21 below.

marry Cambina, Triamond's sister, and Triamond marry Canace, Cambel's sister. They all live together in perfect concord.

At the opening of canto four Discord tries to incite Blandamour and Paridel to attack Cambel and Triamond, but Cambina allays their fierceness, and they ride in concord to the tournament held to determine who should have the true Florimel's girdle. They soon meet Braggadochio with the false Florimel; Ate and Florimel attempt to stir up discord, but Cambel frustrates their efforts. The tournament lasts three days. On the first day Satyrane is the victor; on the second, Triamond; on the third, Britomart. The judges decide that, since Britomart is the final victor, the award shall go to her. A beauty contest is held to determine who shall be allowed to wear the girdle and have the honor of accompanying the winner. The judges decide in favor of the make-believe Florimel, and she is awarded the girdle and given to Britomart, who refuses to accept her. She is now adjudged Triamond's, who likewise will have nothing to do with her. When Florimel is given over to Satyrane, Ate begins to stir up discord among the sensuous-minded knights present and much bickering among them results. Some of them challenge Satyrane to single combat for the possession of Florimel, who, when finally allowed to choose for herself, goes off with Braggadochio. Through the mischief-making of Ate, Scudamour is driven to the House of Care, where his experience exemplifies how her powerful influence may upset even a noble person's mind in such a way that he becomes, for the time being, a victim of discord.

In accordance with Spenser's practice in the *Faerie Queene* of exhibiting a crucial situation or fundamental motif near the middle of each book, the sixth canto seems to be pivotal. Through a misunderstanding Artegal attacks Britomart; but when he recognizes her true beauty and she beholds his manly face, they become friends forever. In this episode Spenser's conception of concord in human society is brought to a focus. Chastity of Book Three, friendship of Book Four, and justice of Book Five—aspects of a comprehensive principle of concord rooted in the nature of things—converge in this canto.

In canto seven the account of the savage man who carries Amoret and Æmylia off to his cave illustrates how lust operates against friendship. In the episode of Timias and Belphoebe a slight error by Timias causes Belphoebe to become indignant, to accuse him of disloyalty, and to dismiss him. Here Spenser seems to be illustrating how jealousy operates against harmony.

In the story of Arthur, Æmylia, and Amoret in the eighth canto slander is exemplified as an enemy of concord. In the latter part of the canto is the account of the friendship of Amyas and Placidas. Their friendship inspires Placidas to hazard his life for his friend. The episode is completed in canto nine. Arthur intervenes, rescues Placidas, and, having influenced Pœana to reform, induces Placidas

to marry her, thus establishing harmony. Toward the end of canto nine Britomart and Scudamour are drawn into a fight over the make-believe Florimel in which Blandamour and Paridel and two other lustful knights, incited by Duessa and Ate, are engaged. Again Arthur intervenes, rescues Britomart and Scudamour, and institutes concord.

In canto ten Scudamour gives an account of how he searched for and found his long-lost Amoret in the Temple of Venus. At the threshold of the Temple he is befriended by Lady Concord. That a concord-discord anthithesis is implicit in Spenser's conception of friendship is here definitely brought out: Lady Concord is described as being attended by Love and Hate, incarnations of aspects of concord and discord respectively. She admits Scudamour to the Temple, where he implores the aid of Venus. Finding Amoret sitting in the lap of Womanhood, he takes her by the hand and leads her away.

With the account of the ceremonies at the marriage of the Thames and the Medway and the story of how Marinel and Florimel are finally brought together Spenser completes his allegory.

Several passages in Spenser's poetry outside of the Fourth Book also contain the conception of love as a harmonizing and unifying force. In *An Hymne in Honour of Love* the universe is regarded as a kind of organism, the world having been brought out of chaos and all its parts bound together by the sythesizing power of love, which continues to maintain concord. The following lines from that *Hymne* indicate Spenser's point of view:

> The world that was not till he did it make;
> Whose sundrie parts he from them selues did seuer,
> The which before had lyen confused euer.
>
> The earth, the ayre, the water, and the fyre,
> Then gan to raunge them selues in huge array,
> And with contrary forces to conspyre
> Each against other, by all meanes they may,
> Threatning their owne confusion and decay:
> Ayre hated earth, and water hated fyre,
> Till Loue relented their rebellious yre.
>
> He then them tooke, and tempering goodly well
> Their contrary dislikes with loued meanes,
> Did place them all in order, and compell
> To keepe them selues within their sundrie raines,
> Together linkt with Adamantine chaines;
> Yet so, as that in euery liuing wight
> They mixe themselues, and shew their kindly might.
>
> (ll. 75-91)

The same theory recurs in *An Hymne in Honour of Beautie:*

> For if you loosely loue without respect,
> It is no loue, but a discordant warre,
> Whose vnlike parts amongst themselues do iarre.
>
> For Loue is a celestial harmonie,
> Of likely harts.[3] (ll. 194-198)

A similar idea appears also in *Colin Clouts Come Home Againe:*

> For by his [love's] powre the world was made of yore,
> And all that therein wondrous doth appeare.
> For how should else things so far from attone
> And so great enemies as of them bee,
> Be euer drawne together into one,
> And taught in such accordance to agree?
> Through him the cold began to couet heat,
> And water fire; the light to mount on hie,
> And th' heauie downe to peize; the hungry t'eat
> And voydnesse to seeke full satietie.
> So being former foes, they wexed friends,
> And gan by litle learne to loue each other:
>
> (ll. 841-852)

These passages in Spenser's doctrinal poems, containing the same theory as that found in the Fourth Book, help to determine the main implications of his conception of friendship in that book. Allegorizing there this teaching of the function of love, he obviously did not abandon it.

In each book of the *Faerie Queene* the most important adventures or episodes occur in the concluding two or three cantos. The Fourth Book is typical in this respect. In the last two cantos Spenser's conception of friendship, already explicitly set forth in the tenth, seems to be effectively illustrated.[4] When Spenser is about to relate something impor-

[3] This passage also reflects the proverbial theory that friendship is based on similarity—a principle definitely echoed in Book Four. See pp. 33-37 below.

[4] The critics do not agree with this interpretation. Commenting on the last two cantos of the Fourth Book, Professor Erskine, "The Virtue of Friendship in the *Faerie Queene*," *PMLA* 30 (1915). 850, says: "One feels that he [Spenser] was running out of ideas and out of allegorical material." Mr. Notcutt, "The *Faerie Queene* and Its Critics," *Essays and Studies*, 12 (Oxford, 1926). 74, disposes of these cantos with the verdict that "the end of the book . . . forms a supplement to the aspects of Friendship with which the book has been concerned." Miss Evelyn May Albright, "On the Dating of Spenser's 'Mutability' Cantos,"

tant, it is his practice to invoke the aid of the gods. At the beginning of canto eleven there is such an invocation. In this canto and in canto twelve is presented an account of the elaborate ceremonies at the marriage of the Thames and the Medway, and the story of the marriage of Marinel and Florimel. It is highly significant that here at the end of the book there are illustrations of friendship taken from nature. The theory set forth in these cantos seems to be consistent with the conception of friendship delineated in the book as a whole, for here occur examples of the power of friendship as a unifying cosmic force. In completing his allegory, Spenser utilizes the myth of the "*Venus* of the fomy sea" (4. 12. 2). Thus he employs the myth of the two Venuses in order to show that friendship is an aspect of cosmic love in the nature of things.

Mr. H. C. Notcutt [5] ably maintains that the Fourth Book is not, as Spenser's critics have held, formless. His thesis that Ate (Discord), realistically and symbolically drawn near the opening of the book, is meant to be set over against the striking account of Concord near the end of the book seems valid. Any one who ever read the book through carefully has doubtless observed this contrast; but Mr. Notcutt, in demonstrating that the book has design, has shown that the contrast is manifestly purposeful. It would be strange indeed if this antithesis, of such high structural importance in the book, did not have allegorical implications also. Mr. Notcutt, however, has dealt only incidentally with this aspect of the poem. In addition to evincing that Book Four has design, his aim is to point out that it is structurally related to Books Three and Five. Considerable evidence has already been adduced to show that Spenser conceives of friendship as the operation in the world of man of a principle of universal harmony. Examination reveals that a concord-discord antithesis, apparently necessary in allegorizing such a conception, pervades the book as a whole.[6]

This antithesis in the Fourth Book is strikingly parallel to

SP 26 (1929). 486, asserts that "the entire passage on the Medway and the Thames is episodic." See Mills, *op cit.*, pp. 271-273.

[5] *Op. cit.*, pp. 63-86.

[6] Compare the synopsis of the Fourth Book given above, pp. 3-5.

the conflict in *Mutabilitie,* although the conflict in the Fourth Book is social, whereas the conflict in *Mutabilitie* is cosmic. The main characters in *Mutabilitie* have their counterpart in the Fourth Book. Nature and Sergeant Order parallel Venus and Concord; Mutability and Bellona parallel Ate and Duessa. When Nature reigns in the universe, order results; when Venus reigns in the realm of man, concord results. Mutability strives to bring about disorder in the universe; Ate strives to bring about discord in the realm of man.

The description of Nature is analogous to the description of Venus: a halo of mysticism surrounds both of them. Each is covered with a veil; each is described as a beautiful woman; and each is represented as awe-inspiring. These are only some of the details which indicate similarity; there are others. The chief point of interest is that each is represented as the mother of all good. The conception of the work of Nature in the universe discussed in *Mutabilitie* is incarnate in Sergeant Order; the conception of the work of Venus in the realm of man discussed in the Fourth Book is incarnate in Lady Concord. These personified abstractions alone show that Spenser's conception of Nature is essentially identical with his conception of Venus. With the aid of Sergeant Order Nature prevents " confusion and disorder " (7. 7. 4) and

> Right to all dost deale indifferently,
> Damning all Wrong and tortious Iniurie,
> Which any of thy creatures doe to other
> (Oppressing them with power, vnequally)
> Sith of them all thou art the equall mother,
> And knittest each to each, as brother vnto brother.
> (7. 7. 14)

Compare the work of Concord, represented as the mother of peace and friendship, who

> strife, and warre, and anger does subdew:
> Of litle much, of foes she maketh frends,
> And to afflicted minds sweet rest and quiet sends.
>
> By her the heauen is in his course contained,
> And all the world in state vnmoued stands,
> As their Almightie maker first ordained,
> And bound them with inuiolable bands. (4. 10. 34-35)

The similarity between Ate and Mutability is equally striking. Ate came "from below, Out of the dwellings of the damned sprights" (4. 1. 19), and so did Mutability, a descendant of Chaos (7. 6. 26-27). In their mischief-making each is aided by "borrowed beautie" (4. 1. 31; compare 7. 6. 28-30). Ate receives assistance in stirring up strife from Duessa who accompanies her; Mutability, from Bellona, her sister (mentioned in 4. 1. 14). Ate strives to undo the work of Concord; Mutability strives to undo the work of Nature. Of Ate it is said:

> For all her studie was and all her thought,
> How she might ouerthrow the things that Concord wrought.
> . . . . . .
> For all this worlds faire workmanship she tride,
> Vnto his last confusion to bring,
> And that great golden chaine quite to diuide,
> With which it blessed Concord hath together tide.
> (4. 1. 29-30)

Of Mutability it is said:

> For, she the face of earthly things so changed,
> That all which Nature had establisht first
> In good estate, and in meet order ranged,
> She did pervert, and all their statutes burst:
> And all the worlds faire frame (which none yet durst
> Of Gods or men to alter or misguide)
> She alter'd quite, and made them all accurst
> That God had blest; and did at first prouide
> In that still happy state for euer to abide. (7. 6. 5)

There are still other points of similarity between the Fourth Book and *Mutabilitie*. In addition to the emphasis on the concord-discord conflict in the Fourth Book, the question of mutability as such is raised more than once. In the eighth canto there are some truly choruslike mutability stanzas. In the "antique age yet in the infancie Of time," according to the passage (4. 8. 30-34), friendship was the ruling principle both in the material universe and in the world of man. Then man's reason governed his passions and desires and "loyall loue had royall regiment." Now the world has fallen into corruption through lawless lust and has therefore "vutterly decayd." In

addition to showing that the idea of mutability is definitely discussed in the Fourth Book, the passage helps to make certain the importance of the choruslike stanzas in canto ten dealing with the place of concord in human society.

Another mutability passage in the Fourth Book comes in connection with Spenser's famous tribute to Chaucer and contains the theme of Time the destroyer prominent in *Mutabilitie*. The passage begins thus:

> But wicked Time that all good thoughts doth waste,
> And workes of noblest wits to nought out weare,
> That famous moniment hath quite defaste,
> And robd the world of threasure endlesse deare.
> (4. 2. 33)

Compare the following from *Mutabilitie*:

> For, who sees not, that *Time* on all doth pray?
> But *Times* do change and moue continually.
> So nothing here long standeth in one stay. (7. 7. 47)

It is significant that this theme is introduced in the Fourth Book in connection with Chaucer, for he is also mentioned in *Mutabilitie*, in certain features of which his influence seems manifest.[7] There can be no question about his influence in the Fourth Book: his *Squire's Tale* is completed there. Professor Greenlaw[8] has suggested that in *Mutabilitie* the theme of time as the enemy of all things is a Lucretian echo. Since we know that the Hymn to Venus upon which Spenser bases his theory of friendship comes from *De Rerum Natura*, the theme of Time the destroyer in the Fourth Book is possibly a reminiscence of the same source.[9]

The personification of rivers in *Mutabilitie* (7. 6. 40-41) is expanded into almost a full canto in the Fourth Book (canto 11), a fact which has more significance than perhaps appears at first sight.

It is Spenser's practice in the *Faerie Queene* to comment on the implications of a canto or a book at the beginning of the next. In the prologue to Book Five, accordingly, there is a description of the world in the Golden Age of universal con-

[7] Cf. Greenlaw, "Some Old Religious Cults in Spenser," *SP* 20 (1923). 218-220.
[8] "Spenser and Lucretius," *SP* 17 (1920). 461-462.
[9] Cf. *F. Q.* 4. 2. 33 with *De Rerum Natura* 5. 828-835.

cord, and the ideal harmony which characterized that age is contrasted with the discord widespread at the present time.[10] Spenser says that in the Golden Age harmony prevailed in the world of man, for then " all men sought their owne, and none no more " (5. Proem 3) ; but now

> the heauens reuolution
> Is wandred farre from where it first was pight,
> (5. Proem 4)

and all things

> doe at randon roue
> Out of their proper places farre away,
> And all this world with them amisse doe moue,
> And all his creatures from their course astray,
> Till they arriue at their last ruinous decay.
> (5. Proem 6)

This comment by the poet himself greatly strengthens the hypothesis that the conflict portrayed in the Fourth Book is essentially the same as that set forth in *Mutabilitie.*

The sixty-fifth sonnet of the *Amoretti* is made up of the concord-discord antithesis, which serves further to indicate that this idea was deeply rooted in Spenser's conception of the nature of things.

The parallelism between the underlying conception of Book Four and that of *Mutabilitie* is too close to be neglected. When the two poems are studied together, the parallelism takes on meaning.

1. The striking parallelism between the Fourth Book and *Mutabilitie,* coupled with the possibility of definite Lucretian influence in *Mutabilitie* [11] and the fact that there is important Lucretian material in the Fourth Book, suggests that they were written at about the same time. The further fact that certain parts of Book Three deal with the question of mutability [12] also favors this possibility. The Fourth Book was evidently written after 1590, the date of the publication of the

[10] Erskine, *op. cit.,* p. 845.

[11] Greenlaw, " Spenser and Lucretius," *SP* 17 (1920). 439-464.

[12] *Ibid., passim;* also, " Some Old Religious Cults in Spenser," *SP* 20 (1923). 216-243.

first three books, for the end of the Third Book was altered after 1590, as the 1596 edition shows, in order that the story might be continued. There is therefore good reason for believing that Book Four and *Mutabilitie* were written soon after 1590.[13]

2. The fact that the concord-discord conflict in the Fourth Book is paralleled by a similar conflict in another of Spenser's poems gives added significance to the conception by indicating its importance in his thought: apparently he did not discard the mutability theme.

3. The parallel is further evidence of the soundness of the thesis that in Book Four Spenser is portraying friendship as the operation in the world of man of a principle of cosmic love.

4. The Fourth Book is similar to *Mutabilitie* in that there seems to be nothing distinctively Christian in it. Spenser's conception of friendship as a principle of concord operating in the world of man to produce harmony and of discord as a force operating to frustrate it is classical.

5. Kinship between *Mutabilitie* and the Fourth Book is corroborative of the hypothesis that Mutabilitie belongs to the *Faerie Queene*.

Finding in Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, Cicero, and other classi-

[13] There are still other reasons for believing that *Mutabilitie* was written at about the same time as the Fourth Book. In a study of the "Feminine Rimes in the *Faerie Queene*," *JEGP* 26 (1927). 91-95, Mr. Floyd Stovall has pointed out that in the first three books there are only two examples of feminine rime, whereas in the last three there are 271: Book IV contains 104; Book V, 97; Book VI, 70; *Mutabilitie*, 17. That *Mutabilitie* was meant to be part of the *Faerie Queene* is supported by considerable evidence. It does not, however, so far as the period of composition is concerned, belong to the first three books, for in those books Spenser has deliberately avoided feminine rimes. It must therefore be grouped with the last three books. The fact that *Mutabilitie* and the Fourth Book contain more frequent feminine rimes than the Fifth and Sixth Books is evidence for believing that they were written at about the same time. The use of feminine rimes in the last three books is in accord with the poet's general policy of less restraint adopted in those books and in *Mutabilitie*. For example, in the Fourth Book and in *Mutabilitie* there are frequent run-on lines, whereas in the first three books there are very few. This was pointed out by Mr. J. C. Smith in his edition of the *Faerie Queene* (Oxford, 1909-1910); compare F. M. Padelford, "The *Cantos of Mutabilitie*: Further Considerations Bearing on the Date," *PMLA* 45 (1930). 704-711.

cal authors emphasis on friendship as an object of aspiration, many Elizabethan writers became interested in the theme and evidently attempted to revive it. Elyot, Edwards, Lyly, Greene, and many others give considerable attention to the subject. It is under the influence of this widespread interest, of course, that Spenser wrote the Fourth Book.[14] However, in view of the evidence that Spenser bases his theory of friendship on Lucretius' Hymn to Venus, the similarity between his theory of concord as the organizing principle in the realm of man and Lucretius' theory of the development of the world out of chaos is significant. In Lucretius there is an exposition of the conflict between the principle of concord and the principle of discord in the nature of things; in Spenser there is an exposition of the same principles in conflict in the world of man. It is possible therefore that Spenser became interested in the theory as a result of a study of *De Rerum Natura*. The apparent close kinship between *Mutabilitie* and the Fourth Book and the probable influence of Lucretius on *Mutabilitie* favor this possibility, as also do several Lucretian echoes scattered throughout the Fourth Book. Although Lucretius gives little attention to the organization of human society, he suggests that friendship is responsible for the origin and perpetuation of civilization. For example, he says:

> Then also neighbours began eagerly to join friendship amongst themselves to do no hurt and suffer no violence, and asked protection for their children and womankind, signifying by voice and gesture with stammering tongue that it was right for all to pity the weak. Nevertheless concord could not altogether be produced, but a good part, nay the most kept the covenant unblemished, or else the race of mankind would have been even then wholly destroyed.[15]

Spenser's indebtedness to Lucretius in the Fourth Book is therefore perhaps much greater than any one has suspected.

[14] Cf. Erskine, *op. cit.*, pp. 831-850; also Mills, *op. cit., passim.* Mr. Mills has given an excellent account of the revival of the friendship theme in the Renaissance.

[15] *De Rerum Natura*, tr. by W. H. D. Rouse, Loeb Classical Library (1931), p. 413.

However, since theories of concord similar to Spenser's were widespread,[16] it is impossible to determine the extent of that indebtedness.

[16] Compare the material presented in the succeeding chapters together with the following: Empedocles, fragments numbered 22 and 26 by Diels, tr. by John Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, 3rd. ed. (London, 1920), pp. 209-210; Plato, *Gorgias* 507-508, Jowett, 3rd, ed., 2. 399-400; Aristotle, *N. Eth.* 9. 6. 1-2; Cicero, *De Amicitia* 6; Chaucer, *Troilus and Criseyde*, 3, stanzas 250-252; Ficino, *Commentarium in Convivium*, 3. 3; Castiglione, *Courtier*, tr. Hoby, Everyman ed., p. 321; Elyot, *The Gouernour*, ed. by Croft (London, 1883), 2. 122-123; Churchyard, "A Sparke of Friendship and Warme Good-Will," Nichols, *Progresses and Public Processions of Queen Elizabeth* (London, 1823) 2. 587-590; Ariosto, *Orlando Furioso* 24. 114.

II

SPENSER'S THEORY OF FRIENDSHIP: AN ELIZABETHAN COMMONPLACE

In portraying friendship or concord in the Fourth Book of the *Faerie Queene* Spenser sets it over against discord and emblems the struggle between these two forces for the possession of men's souls. Discord, a vice, is a powerful force for destroying friendship; concord, a virtue, is a harmonizing and unifying principle of cosmic love operating in the realm of man to promote friendship. Discord, realistically and symbolically depicted near the beginning of the book, controls the action, for the most part, in the first several cantos, and has a potent influence until toward the end of the book, where concord is portrayed as being in full control. The work of concord is there explicitly stated and effectively allegorized.[1] Spenser says:

> *Concord* she cleeped was in common reed,
> Mother of Blessed *Peace,* and *Friendship* trew;
> They both her twins, both borne of heauenly seed,
> And she her selfe likewise diuinely grew;
> The which right well her workes diuine did shew:
> For strength, and wealth, and happinesse she lends,
> And strife, and warre, and anger does subdew:
> Of litle much, of foes she maketh frends,
> And to afflicted minds sweet rest and quiet sends.
>
> By her the heauen is in his course contained,
> And all the world in state vnmoued stands,
> As their Almightie maker first ordained,
> And bound them with inuiolable bands;
> Else would the waters ouerflow the lands,
> And fire deuoure the ayre, and hell them quight,
> But that she holds them with her blessed hands.
> She is the nourse of pleasure and delight,
> And vnto *Venus* grace the gate doth open right.
> (4. 10. 34-35)

Each episode seems to be a kind of *exemplum,* illustrating what true concord is, or what it is not, or how the forces of discord

[1] *Cf.* H. C. Notcutt, "The *Faerie Queene* and Its Critics," *Essays and Studies* 12 (Oxford, 1926). 63-86; H. S. V. Jones, *A Spenser Handbook* (New York, 1930), pp. 231-247; and pp. 1-7 above.

operate to destroy it. Discord is able to get full control of the wicked and the evil-minded only.

This technique and even this moral conflict is suggestive of Elizabethan masques and pageants, and examination of these entertainments reveals that a point of view strikingly similar to Spenser's is there definitely figured forth. At the beginning of Elizabeth's reign the theory that concord could solve the social and political problems confronting England was the primary motif of a pageant in her honor, as the following account shows:

> For like as the long warre betwene the two Houses of Yorke and Lancastre then ended, when Elizabeth daughter to Edward the Fourth matched in marriage with Henry the Seventhe, heyre to the Howse of Lancastre; so since that the Quenes Majesties name was Elizabeth, and forsomuch as she is the onelye heire of Henrye the Eighth, which came of bothe the howses, as the knitting up of concorde, it was devised, that like as Elizabeth was the first occasion of concorde, so she, another Elizabeth, myght maintaine the same among her subjectes, so that unitie was the ende whereat the whole devise shotte.[2]

Elizabeth "Promised that she would doe her whole endevour for the continuall preservation of concorde, as the Pageant did emport."[3]

A parallel perhaps as close to the concord-discord conflict in the Fourth Book as any in Elizabethan masques and pageants is the account in Holinshed of an entertainment in honor of Alençon at Antwerp. Concord as a harmonizing and unifying force and discord as a strife-producing force are there clearly symbolized. The description of the character Concord parallels closely the account of Lady Concord in Spenser (4. 10. 34-35). For example, Holinshed says:

> Before the damosell sate Concord, clothed in white, yellow, and orange tawnie, bearing a target vpon hir arme, wherein was painted a crowned scepter, with two little snakes; and vnder them, two dooues, all closed in with a garland of olife, betokening commend-

[2] *The Passage of our most drad Soveraigne Lady Quene Elyzabeth through the Citie of London to Westminster, the daye before her Coronation, Anno 1558-9. Imprinted at London, in Flete-strete, within Temple-barre, at the signe of the Hand and Starre, by Richard Tottill, the xxiii day of January, Cum privilegio,* John Nichols, *The Progresses and Public Processions of Queen Elizabeth* (London, 1823) 1. 42.

[3] *Ibid.* 1. 42.

able gouernement with prouidence. Vpon hir head shee had a helmet, betokening Wisedome. In hir hand shee caried a lance, with a penon vpon it, on the one side whereof were the armes of Aniou crowned with olife, and on the other side a lambe with a woolfe, and a lion with an ox, to betoken the great peacefulnesse that is looked for vnder this prince, as well in religion as in matters of state. At Concordes right hand sat Wisedome, and at hir left hand Force. In the middest of the chariot was a piller richlie made of Corinthian worke, vpon the top whereof was a Hart held betweene two armed hands, which hart had two wings, betokening Vnion, Faith, and Force: and a sword with two serpents writhing about it, and holding their tailes to their eares; signifieng Discreet gouernement, and eares stopped against flatterers.[4]

Certain details in this excerpt are suggestive of other details in Spenser. The "Hart," for instance, suggests the "Ruby heart" in canto eight (4. 8. 6-18).

Another representative selection from this pageant reveals a conception of concord essentially like Spenser's:

And so passing by the ward there, he went to the place that is right over against the mint: before the which there was a huge and monstrous sea-horsse of twentie foot high, vpon whom sat a nymph called Concord, bearing a shield wherein was painted a booke and a rod, which was named the Rule of truth. In hir hand she bare a flag, wherein was written, Faithfull aliance. This monster of the sea was named Tyrannie, and he had a bridle in his mouth with double reines of iron chained called Law and Reason. Whereby the dukes highnesse was doone to vnderstand, that he as a true Perseus was to deliuer that countrie from all tyrannie, and afterward to gouerne it by iustice and reason.[5]

Holinshed's account of Discord and her influence is also strikingly analogous to Spenser's. With Spenser (4. 1. 19-30) compare the following from Holinshed:

On the other side being the left hand, were drierie and barren fields, the aire everie where lowring and cloudie, and the trees and plants withered; which thing was doone by the three helhounds, Discord, Violence, and Tyrannie, who fled awaie at the sight of his highnes, according to the signification of his other word, Chaseth.[6]

[4] "The Roiall Interteinement of the Right High and Mightie Prince, Francis the French Kings onelie Brother, by the Grace of God Duke of Brabant, Aniou, Alanson, Berrie, &c, into the Citie of Antwerpe," *Chronicles of England, Scotland, and Ireland* (London, 1808) 4. 475-476; also found in Nichols, *op. cit.* 2. 368.

[5] Holinshed, *op. cit.* 4. 480.

[6] *Ibid.* 4. 479-480.

Right ouer against this pageant was an other on the side of the street called the Flax market, which was a mossie rocke ouergrowen with drie and withered trees, wherein appeared a caue verie hideous, darke, and drierie to behold, and in the same laie lurking the three helhounds, Discord, Violence, and Tyrannie: who feeling Apollos beames, and hearing the sweetnesse and harmonie of the voices and instruments, shroonke awaie and hid themselues in the deepest of the dungeon, and afterward peered out againe to harken whether that melodie and harmonie continued still or no, minding to have come foorth againe, and to have troubled the common wealth, if the same had ceassed.[7]

Not only is the conception of concord and discord in this pageant similar to Spenser's, but the relation of concord to discord is the same in both, as the following, compared with Spenser, reveals:

[7] *Ibid.* 4. 482-483. Professor Merritt Y. Hughes in his *Virgil and Spenser* (Berkeley, 1929), p. 379, says "the description of Ate's house with which he [Spenser] broke ground for the 'Legend of Friendship'" is a "reminiscence of Virgil's Sixth Book." A perhaps closer parallel, however, is in Sackville, to whom Spenser not only acknowledged indebtedness, but whose poetry Spenser praised in a sonnet addressed to him in 1590. Thomas Warton, *History of English Poetry*, ed. W. C. Hazlitt (London, 1871) 4. 177, says: "The readers of the *Faerie Queene* will easily point out many particular passages which Sackville's *Induction* suggested to Spenser." The *Induction* (ll. 400-476) has the following elements in common with *F. Q.* 4. 1. 19-24. 1. Spenser's description of "*Ate*, mother of debate, And all dissention" (4. 1. 19) as the promoter of discord is strikingly similar to Sackville's description of

> Deadly *Debate*, all full of snaky hair,
> That with a bloody fillet was ybound,
> Out breathing naught but discord every where.
>
> (ll. 401-403)

Ate and Deadly Debate are alike hideous and powerful instigators of discord. 2. The abode of both Ate and Deadly Debate is Hades. 3. Spenser's description of the inside of Ate's cave follows Sackville's account closely: for example, the things noted by Spenser in *F. Q.* 4. 1. 21 are either mentioned or illustrated by Sackville. 4. The more important historical examples of civil strife caused by Ate—"fatall Thebes," Rome, "sad Ilion," and Alexander the Great (*F. Q.* 4. 1. 22)—are enlarged upon in Sackville's account of the civil strife caused by Deadly Debate. 5. On the walls of Ate's cave are relics of the "broken bandes" which have bound many friends together (*F. Q.* 4. 1. 24); Deadly Debate has caused "great cruelty, and the deep bloodshed Of friends" (*Induction*, ll. 424-425). This striking analogue, in conjunction with that from Holinshed given above and those previously suggested (Todd, *Works of Edmund Spenser* 5. 149-153; Hughes, *op. cit.*, pp. 379-381), indicates that Spenser's account of the cave of Discord was probably written under the influence of more than one passage and that specific source ascription for it is therefore dangerous.

The chiefe instruments of discord, namelie, Enuie and Slander, . . . peered out behind, Enuie gnawing hir owne heart, and Slander hauing double heart, double toong, and double face, howbeit with small effect. For of the two sides of this pageant were two counterfets, on the one side Hercules, and on the other Dauid, as it were in copper, hauing gotten the vpper hand of Goliah, betokening strength and stowtnesse: and vnderneath was Concord, who held Discord in a chaine with collars about his necke; which Discord offering with his one hand an apple of gold, and with his other hand threatning men with his force and tyrannie, was yet neuerthelesse driuen into the dungeon of sorrow, where he is kept prisoner by Concord, who keepeth the doore fast shut: betokening the same thing which the countrie looketh for at his highnesse hand according to his posie Cherisheth and Chaseth. Vpon the forefront of the compartement made of Phrygian worke were these verses following painted out in most liuelie forme:

O let the earth the kissings sweet
of peace and iustice see,
And let hir powre hir riches foorth
in all mens bosoms free:
Let godlines and faithfulnes
go matched arme in arme,
And let the bond of endlesse loue
keepe all things knit from harme.[8]

The "instruments of discord, namelie, Enuie and Slander" described here are instruments of discord in the Fourth Book. The conception of the "double heart, double toong, and double face" of Slander is elaborated in Spenser's description of Ate (4. 1. 27-29).

Other accounts of concord and discord in Elizabethan masques and pageants similar to the above could be cited. These examples, however, are representative and show that Spenser's theory was definitely present in them.

In Lyly's *The Woman in the Moone* Concord and Discord are portrayed as personified abstractions of the two fundamental principles in nature. Represented as Nature's handmaids, Concord is portrayed as a harmonizing and unifying force and Discord as a strife-producing force—Spenser's point of view.[9] The following lines spoken by Nature indicate the conception presented by Lyly in these characters:

[8] Holinshed, *op. cit.* 4. 481.
[9] Cf. *F. Q.* 4. 10. 32-33.

I tell thee *Discord* while you twaine [Concord and Discord] attend
On *Natures* traine, your worke must proove but one;
And in your selues though you be different,
Yet in my seruice must you well agree.
For *Nature* workes her will from contraries.[10]

In Elizabethan literature perhaps the most striking parallel to the concord passage in Spenser is a fine chorus in Gascoigne's *Jocasta*:

O Blisful concord, bredde in sacred brest
Of him that guides the restlesse rolling sky,
That to the earth for mans assured rest
From heigth of heavens vouchsafest downe to flie,
In thee alone the mightie power doth lie,
With swete accorde to kepe the frouning starres
And every planet else from hurtfull warres.

In thee, in thee such noble vertue bydes,
As may commaund the mightiest Gods to bend,
From thee alone such sugred frendship slydes
As mortall wightes can scarcely comprehend,
To greatest strife thou setst delightfull ende,
O holy peace, by thee are onely founde
The passing joyes that every where abound.

Thou onely thou, through thy celestiall might,
Didst first of al, the heavenly pole devide
From th'olde confused heape that *Chaos* hight:
Thou madste the Sunne, the Moone, and starres to glide,
With ordred course about this world so wide:
Thou hast ordainde *Dan Tytans* shining light,
By dawne of day to chase the darkesome night.

. . . . . .

By thee, the basest thing advaunced is,
Thou everie where, dost graffe such golden peace,
As filleth man, with more than earthly blisse,
The earth by thee, doth yelde hir swete increase
At becke of thee, all bloudy discords cease,
And mightiest Realmes in quiet do remaine,
Whereas thy hand doth holde the royall raine.

But if thou faile, then al things gone to wracke,
The mother then, doth dread hir naturall childe,
Then every towne is subject to the sacke,
Then spotlesse maids, the virgins be defilde,
Then rigor rules, then reason is exilde.[11]

[10] *The Woman in the Moone*, 1. 1. 25-29.

[11] *Jocasta: A Tragedie written in Greeke by Euripides, translated and digested*

This chorus is of the highest importance: it stresses every element of thought expressed in the concord passage in Spenser. The important common elements are: 1. Concord is of divine origin. 2. Concord is the harmonizing and unifying principle of the universe. 3. Concord is the mother of friendship. 4. Concord is the mother of peace. 5. Concord ends strife and war. 6. Concord is the source of joy and happiness. 7. Without the influence of concord chaos would reign in the universe. Furthermore, this passage, like the Fourth Book, sets concord over against discord, and, when brought into relation with the other material in this study, takes on even greater significance.

Professor Gayley [12] maintains with considerable assurance that Ulysses' speech on degree in Shakespeare's *Troilus and Cressida* is indebted to a passage in Chaucer [13] on the power of love, a passage reflecting a doctrine noticeably similar to Spenser's.[14] If Ulysses' speech and Spenser's account of concord are in motive and poetical kinship both closely analogous to Chaucer's conception, there should be some resemblance between Ulysses' speech and Spenser's account. Although it has never been pointed out, the two passages do contain strikingly similar theories. The following lines reveal Ulysses' point of view:

> The heavens themselves, the planets, and this centre
> Observe degree, priority, and place,
> Insisture, course, proportion, season, form,
> Office, and custom, in all line of order:
> . . . . . .
> . . . But when the planets
> In evil mixture to disorder wander,
> What plagues and what portents, what mutiny!
> What raging of the sea, shaking of earth,
> Commotion of the winds, frights, changes, horrors,

into Acte by George Gascoygne, and Francis Kinwelmershe of Grayes Inne, and there by them presented, 1566, *The Complete Works of George Gascoigne,* ed. John W. Cunliffe (Cambridge, 1907), 1. 305-307.

[12] *Shakespeare and the Founders of Liberty in America* (New York, 1917), pp. 166-168.

[13] *Troilus and Criseyde,* Book 3, stanzas 250-252.

[14] According to Todd, *Works of Edmund Spenser* (London, 1805) 5. 411-412, the concord passage in Spenser (*F. Q.* 4. 10. 34-35) is "plainly imitated" from the passage in Boethius which "Chaucer has translated" in *Troilus and Criseyde,* Book 3, stanzas 250-252.

Divert and crack, rend and deracinate
The unity and married calm of states
. . . . . .
Take but degree away, untune that string,
And, hark, what discord follows! each thing meets
In mere oppugnancy: the bounded waters
Should lift their bosoms higher than the shores,
And make a sop of all this solid globe;
Strength should be lord of imbecility,
And the rude son should strike his father dead;
Force should be right, or rather, right and wrong,
Between whose endless jar justice resides,
Should lose their names, and so should justice too.[15]

The underlying idea of law in this speech is fundamentally Spenser's idea of concord. Shakespeare thinks law is the bond that holds the universe together; Spenser thinks it is the principle of concord. The concord-discord antithesis in the Fourth Book is essentially the same antithesis Ulysses so eloquently expounds. Professor Gayley[16] says "we may be confident, if one is ever justified in tracing the details of a poet's fancy to a definite source, that Shakespeare drew some of the details" of Ulysses' speech from Chaucer. The chorus from Gascoigne given above and the concord passage in Spenser in both motive and detail seem to be as close to Ulysses' speech as is the selection from Chaucer.

The conception of law in Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity* as the bond that binds the whole creation to God is essentially Spenser's conception of concord. Likewise, Spenser's theory that concord in the universe and in the realm of man is warred on by discord is implicit in Hooker's philosophy.[17] The concluding sentence in Book I of the *Ecclesiastical Polity* is a pertinent comment, not only on Hooker's concept of law, but also on Spenser's theory of concord:

Of Law there can be no less acknowledged, than that her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world; all things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very least as feeling her

[15] *Troilus and Cressida* 1. 3. 85-118.

[16] *Op. cit.*, p. 166.

[17] Cf. *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Book 1*, ed. R. W. Church (Oxford, 1905), pp. 13-14 with Spenser (*F. Q.* 4. 10. 34-35). Gayley (*op. cit.*, pp. 162-190), following Verplanck, holds that Ulysses' speech is indebted to this passage in Hooker.

care, and the greatest as not exempted from her power; both Angels and men and creatures of what condition soever, though each in different sort and manner, yet all with uniform consent, admiring her as the mother of their peace and joy.[18]

A passage in Bruno's *Heroic Enthusiasts* expresses a point of view similar to that found in all these parallel passages, although it has never been mentioned apparently in connection with any of them. Bruno says:

> There must be artisans, mechanics, agriculturists, servants, trotters, ignoble, low, poor, pedants and such like, for otherwise there could not be philosophers, mediators, cultivators of souls, masters, captains, nobles, illustrious ones, rich, wise, and the rest who may be heroes like to gods. Now why should we force ourselves to corrupt the state of nature which has separated the universe into things major and minor, superior and inferior, illustrious and obscure, worthy and unworthy, not only outside ourselves but also inside in the substance of us, even to that part of us which is said to be immaterial?
>
> So of the intelligences: some are low, others are pre-eminent, some serve and some obey, some command and govern. I believe, however, that this ought not to be brought forward as an example, so that subjects wishing to be superiors, and the ignoble to equal the noble, the order of things would become perverted and confounded, so that a sort of neutrality would supervene, and a brutal equality, such as is found in certain deserts and uncultured republics.[19]

This excerpt is perhaps more suggestive of Ulysses' speech than of Spenser's choruslike stanzas on concord; also, it seems to be more closely related to the ideas about society in the Fifth Book of the *Faerie Queene* than to those in the Fourth. The concord passage, as well as many details scattered throughout the Fourth Book, however, indicates that Spenser's theory there is inherently the same as that expressed by Bruno.

A party in France contemporary with Spenser, known as *les politiques,* championed ideas about society in accord with Spenser's. Of these distinguished policists, at least three—Michel de l'Hôpital, François de la Noue, and Jean Bodin—were probably known to Spenser. The theory of society held by these thinkers is embodied in the concept of harmony,

[18] Hooker, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

[19] Giordano Bruno, *The Heroic Enthusiasts*, tr. by L. Williams (London, 1887-1889), in two parts, Part 2, pp. 53-54.

which, according to them and Spenser alike, should characterize both the inner life of man and society at large. These policists held also that there is in the nature of things a principle of discord at war with concord.[20] De la Noue, whose speculation is typical of the social philosophy of the group as a whole, held that concord alone can bring order out of chaotic society. He says:

> Mais la concorde qui dure, est celle qui est entre les gens de bien, et qui procede des mouvements d'une droite raison illuminée d'enhaut, qui nous rend affectionnez au bien les uns des autres: car estant alimentee d'une humeur radicale si parfaite, elle demeure tousjours vive et fraische comme les arbres qui sont plantez au long des rivages des eaux courantes.[21]

Compare a representative statement from de l'Hôpital:

> Je dis donc que ce qui rend non seulement tous estats, républicques, citez, familles, mais encore chascung homme particulier heureux ou malheureux, sain ou malade, bon ou maulvais, sage ou fol, juste ou injuste, doué de bonnes ou maulvaises qualites et conditions, c'est l'ordre ou le désordre. Cette maxime est des plus certaines, et se vérifie généralement en tout ce qui se trouve en l'univers; et de faict, y a il chose au monde qui estant hors de son lieu, rang et situation naturelle, ne soit incontinent en inquiétude, tourment et vexation? [22]

Professor Jones [23] has shown that the theory of these political philosophers is analogous to that of Spenser in his defense of Grey in the *Veue of the Present State of Ireland* and in the Fifth Book of the *Faerie Queene*. It is significant, therefore, that the principles of concord and discord held by these policists as operating in human society are the same principles Spenser sets over against each other in the Fourth Book. It is not impossible that Spenser's emphasis on these opposing principles was prompted by these thinkers. Ulysses' speech may also owe something to them.

[20] Cf. H. S. V. Jones, *Spenser's Defense of Lord Grey, University of Illinois Studies in Language and Literature*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Urbana, 1919), p. 31.

[21] *Discours politiques et militaires du Seigneur de la Noue. Nouvellement recueillis et mis en lumière à Basle. De l'Imprimerie de François Forest* (1587) 2. 66 (quoted by Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 31).

[22] *Traité de la Reformation de Justice, Œuvres de l'Hôpital*, ed. by P. J. S. Dufey, 5 vols. (Paris, 1824-1825), 1. 13 (quoted by Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 50).

[23] *Op. cit., passim.*

A stanza in Sir John Davies' *Orchestra* should be noted in this connection. Davies says:

> The richest iewell in all the heau'nly treasure
> That euer yet vnto the Earth was showne,
> Is perfect Concord, th' onely perfect pleasure
> That wretched earth-borne men haue euer knowne,
> For many harts it doth compound in one;
> That when so one doth will, or speake, or doe,
> With one consent they all agree thereto.[24]

The fact that this stanza, two excerpts from the *Jocasta* chorus, and the concord passage in Spenser are given under the heading " Concord " in Robert Allot's *Englands Parnassus*,[25] published in 1600, shows that Spenser's theory did not fail to attract the attention of his contemporaries.[26]

The material brought together in this chapter warrants the following observations:

1. It corroborates the thesis that Spenser conceives of friendship as a harmonizing and unifying principle of cosmic love operating in the realm of man to promote concord.

2. The parallels with a point of view analogous to Spenser's here for the first time brought forward must be considered as a part of the provenience of the Fourth Book of the *Faerie Queene* along with the data previously adduced by scholars.

3. Attention has here been called to hitherto unnoted evidence of the importance of the Elizabethan masques and pageants in Spenser's literary environment.

4. Specific source ascription for Spenser's theory of friendship is dangerous: in molding his enchanted glass he uses materials drawn from a multiplicity of sources.

[24] *The Complete Poems of Sir John Davies*, ed. A. B. Grosart (London, 1876), 1. 202-203.

[25] Robert Allot, *Englands Parnassus*, ed. Charles Crawford (Oxford, 1913), pp. 31-32.

[26] There is a stray echo of a point of view similar to Spenser's, although perhaps more reminiscent of Ulysses' speech, in *Paradise Lost*:

> If, Nature's concord broke,
> Among the constellations war were sprung,
> Two planets, rushing from aspect malign
> Of fiercest opposition, in mid sky
> Should combat, and their jarring spheres confound.
> (6. 311-315)

5. Spenser's political philosophy was essentially the same as that of some of his illustrious contemporaries and their respective theories reflect a common fund of reading and of ideas.

6. Evidently Spenser was not concerned with mere abstractions: like Hooker and Shakespeare, he wrote brilliant criticism of life. Although a dreamer of dreams, a poet's poet, he was, at the same time, interested in men and measures.

III

SENTENTIOUS THEORY IN SPENSER'S LEGEND OF FRIENDSHIP

Examination of the various episodes in the Fourth Book of the *Faerie Queene* reveals that Spenser's theory of friendship as the operation in the world of man of a harmonizing and unifying principle of cosmic love [1] is based on certain ideas which seem to satisfy the conditions required by such a conception. The purpose of this chapter is to point out where in the Fourth Book these ideas are found and to show that they were widespread and even considered proverbial in much of the literature with which Spenser was probably acquainted. Expressed in their lowest terms these ideas are: 1. Friendship is based on virtue. 2. Friendship is based on equality. 3. Friendship is based on similarity. 4. Friends have but one soul. 5. A friend is a second self. 6. False friendship cannot last. 7. Friends' goods are common goods. These will be discussed in the foregoing order.

I

Friendship Is Based on Virtue

The Fourth Book of the *Faerie Queene* is infused with the idea that true friendship is based on virtue. In picturing the friendship of Cambel and Triamond, Amoret and Britomart, Scudamour and Amoret, Marinel and Florimel, Amyas and Placidas—all who are represented as genuine friends—Spenser emphasizes virtue as fundamental to friendship. He asserts again and again that without virtue there can be no ideal friendship. The following are among his most proverb-like statements of this doctrine:

> Vertue is the band, that bindeth harts most sure.
> (4. 2. 29)
> That is the crowne of knighthood, and the band
> Of noble minds deriued from aboue,
> Which being knit with vertue, neuer will remoue.
> (4. 6. 31)

[1] See pp. 1-14 above.

For vertues onely sake, which doth beget
True loue and faithfull friendship, she by her did set.
(4. 6. 46)

For basing true friendship on virtue Spenser had high authority. The following passage, with which Cicero closes his *De Amicitia* and which exemplifies a point of view stressed throughout that essay, is typical: "I exhort you . . . so to esteem virtue (without which friendship cannot exist), that, excepting virtue, you will think nothing more excellent than friendship." [2] Representative occurrences of this idea are given below. By Spenser's time it had become essentially proverbial.

Anonymous:

With wisedome chuse thy frend, with vertue him retaine:
Let vertue be the ground, so shall it not be vaine.
("The praise of a true frende," *Tottel's Miscellany*, ed. Rollins, Cambridge, 1928, p. 245)

Aristotle:

The perfect form of friendship is that between the good, and those who resemble each other in virtue. (*N. Eth.* 8. 3, tr. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library, 1926, p. 461)

Friendship based on character is disinterested, and therefore lasting. (*Ibid.* 9. 1, p. 519)

Perfect friendship . . . exists among the good. (*Magna Moralia* 1209[a] 17-18, tr. ed. Ross, Oxford, 1925, Vol. 9)

Friendship . . . of the best men is that which arises from virtue. (*Ibid.* 1209[b] 16-17)

Primary friendship is grounded on virtue. (*Ethica Eudemia* 1237[a] 10-11, Ross, Vol. 9)

The friend through virtue is the only friend. (*Ibid.* 1244[b] 16-17)

Cicero:

Friendship cannot exist except among good men. (*De Amicitia* 5. 18, Falconer, p. 127; 18. 65, p. 177)

Virtue is the parent and preserver of friendship and without virtue friendship cannot exist at all. (*Ibid.* 6. 21, p. 131)

There is nothing more lovable than virtue, nothing that more allures us to affection. (*Ibid.* 8. 28, p. 139)

Virtue knits friendship together. (*Ibid.* 14. 49, p. 161)

The good have for the good, as if from necessity, a kindly feeling which nature has made the fountain of friendship. (*Ibid.* 14. 50, p. 161)

[2] *De Amicitia*, tr. Falconer, Loeb Classical Library, 1927, p. 211.

Friendship was given to us by nature as the handmaid of virtue, not as a comrade of vice. (*Ibid.* 22. 83, p. 191)

We must . . . give our attention to virtue, without which we can obtain neither friendship nor any other desirable thing. (*Ibid.* 22. 84, p. 191)

I exhort you both so to esteem virtue (without which friendship cannot exist), that, excepting virtue, you will think nothing more excellent than friendship. (*Ibid.* 27. 104, p. 211)

Edwards:

But true friendship, indeed,
Of nought but of virtue doth truly proceed.
(*Damon and Pithias* 127-128)

Elyot:

Aristotle saieth that frendship is a vertue or ioyneth with vertue; whiche is affirmed by Tulli, sayenge, that frendship can nat be without vertue, ne but in good men onely. (*Governour*, ed. Croft, London, 1883, 2. 122)

Frendshippe can nat be but in good men, ne may nat be without vertue. (*Ibid.* 2. 123)

Frendshippe is betwene good men onely. (*Ibid.* 2. 162-163)

Frendship may nat be but betwene good men. (*Ibid.* 2. 165)

Greene:

The opinion of vertue is the fountaine of Friendship. (*Morando: The Tritameron of Loue*, *Works*, ed. Grosart, 3. 152)

Grimald:

True vertue gets, and keeps a frend. ("Of frendship," *Tottel's Miscellany*, ed. Rollins, p. 106)

Hudson:

Of vertue onely, perfect loue doth grow. (*Englands Parnassus*, ed. Crawford, Oxford, 1913, p. 135)

Montaigne:

Let this yoke [friendship] be guided by vertue and conduct of reason (because without them it is altogether impossible to combine and proportion the same). ("Of Friendship," *Essays*, tr. Florio, ed. Saintsbury, Tutor Translations, London, 1892, 1. 203)

Plato:

Fate which has ordained that there shall be no friendship among the evil has also ordained that there shall ever be friendship among the good. (*Phaedrus* 255, Jowett, 3rd ed., 1. 462)

He is a friend who is, as well as seems, good. (*Republic* 1. 334-335, Jowett, 3. 10-11)

In asserting that friendship is based on virtue these writers mean to give friendship a high place in life, mean to show that it is a virtue. Such a conception is, of course, the glory of Plato's *Symposium*.[3] In his analysis of the virtues even Aristotle says " friendship is a virtue, or involves virtue." [4] Cicero's *De Amicitia* is a fine discussion of the Platonic idea of friendship. " Of all the bonds of fellowship," he says, " there is none more noble, none more powerful than when good men of congenial character are joined in intimate friendship." [5] In the Middle Ages, although friendship, owing perhaps to the influence of chivalry, was generally thought of as only a social relation, there were some who considered it a virtue. In his discussion on friendship St. Ailred says: " Amicitia igitur ipsa virtus est." [6] Ideas about friendship as a virtue were revived in England in the sixteenth century, as is shown by the prominence of the friendship theme in the literature of the period. In the *Governour*, for example, Elyot gives more attention to friendship than to any other topic. " Very amitie is vertue," he asserts.[7] Lyly, whose pages bristle with classical ideas about friendship, says " the love of men to women is a thing common and of course: the friendshippe of man to man infinite and immortall." [8] Greene says " Frendship is a communion of a perpetuall will " [9]—" the pretious treasure that neither time nor fortune can violate." [10]

[3] Plato's *Lysis* and *Phaedrus* also deal with friendship.

[4] *N. Eth.* 8. 1, Rackham, p. 451. Cf. Elyot, *Governour* 2. 122.

[5] *De Officiis*, tr. Miller, Loeb Classical Library, 1913, p. 59.

[6] *De Spirituali Amicitia*; Migne, *Patrologiae* 195, col. 663.

[7] *Op. cit.* 2. 163.

[8] *Endymion* 3. 4. 114. Cf. J. Q. Adams, *Life of William Shakespeare*, 1923, p. 171: " Whatever the reason, Shakespeare selected a new theme for his sonnetteering effort, the friendship of man for man. And in developing this theme he wove in the idea—a favorite one in the Renaissance—that the friendship of a man for a man is superior to the love of a man for a woman." Cf. also Lyly's *Endymion* 3. 4. 152-161.

[9] *Morando: The Tritameron of Loue, Works*, ed. Grosart, 3. 146.

[10] *Ciceronis Amor, or Tullies Loue, Works*, ed. Grosart, 7. 191.

II

Friendship Is Based on Equality

According to its sub-title, the Fourth Book of the *Faerie Queene* is the "Legend of Cambel and Triamond, or of Friendship," indicating that Spenser thought of those two knights as chiefly typifying the virtue of friendship and of the episodes in which they figure [11] as the most important in the book. Priamond, Diamond, and Triamond—Agape's three sons—fight in turn with Cambel for the hand of his sister Canace. Cambel soon kills Priamond, whose soul unites with Diamond's. In a short time Diamond is also killed, and his soul unites with Triamond's. Now Cambel and Triamond fight a desperate battle, but being *equal in soul* neither can conquer the other. Cambina, driving, like the Great Mother of the gods, a chariot drawn by a pair of lions,[12] comes into the field where they are fighting and reconciles them by giving them a cup of Nepenthe. At once they become friends. Instead of this being "a unique kind of tragic horse-play, a very boyish, saucer-eyed imitation of Ariosto's most brilliant triumphs in the bizarre-heroic," [13] Spenser is here illustrating the fundamental principle that friendship is based on equality,[14] a principle widespread in both classical and Renaissance literature.[15] More than once Aristotle observes that "there is a saying, 'Friendship is equality,' and this is most fully realized in the friendships of the good." [16] According to Plutarch, "friend-

[11] Cantos 2-4.

[12] *F. Q.* 4. 3, 39 ff. It is possible that Spenser got this conception of a woman in a chariot driving a pair of lions from Lucretius, for in several respects Cambina resembles the Great Mother of the gods described by Lucretius (*De Rerum Natura* 2. 600-660): both appear to be divine; both drive a chariot drawn by a pair of lions; both are peacemakers; etc. Spenser refers to "the mother of the Gods" in *F. Q.* 4. 11, 28.

[13] Herbert E. Cory, *Edmund Spenser: A Critical Study*, Berkeley, 1917, p. 261.

[14] Cf. Erskine, "The Virtue of Friendship in the *Faerie Queene*," *PMLA* 30 (1915). 847: "Since by this concentration of souls Triamond was now the spiritual equal of Cambel, they immediately recognized the essential harmony between them, and became fast friends."

[15] In the Middle Ages there are echoes of this principle. For example, Chaucer, in the *Knight's Tale*, in order to make the friendship of Palamon and Arcite as strong as possible makes them equal and similar in character. Cf. Hulbert, "What Was Chaucer's Aim in the *Knight's Tale*," *SP* 26 (1929). 375-385.

[16] *N. Eth.* 8. 5, Rackham, p. 471.

ship . . . is a sort of harmony all of a piece, and admits not the least inequality, unlikeness, or discords of parts." [17] In the Elizabethan period Richard Edwards, as well as many others, held that " friendship stands in true equality." [18] That the principle was widely proverbial is shown by the following examples:

Aristotle:

There is a saying, ' Friendship is equality,' and this is most fully realized in the friendships of the good. (*N. Eth.* 8. 5, Rackham, p. 471)

Equality is felt to be an essential element of friendship. (*Ibid.* 8. 7, p. 479)

Friendship is equality. (*Ibid.* 9. 8, p. 551)

These then are three kinds of friendship; and in all of them the word friendship implies a kind of equality. For even those who are friends through virtue are mutually friends by a sort of equality of virtue. (*Ethica Eudemia* 1238^{b} 15-18, Ross, Vol. 9)

Only those between whom there is equality are friends. (*Ibid.* 1239^{a} 4)

We say about friendship . . . that friendship is equality. (*Ibid.* 1240^{b} 2-3)

Civic friendship looks to equality and to the object as sellers and buyers do; hence the proverb ' a fixed wage for a friend '. (*Ibid.* 1242^{b} 33-34)

Bodenham:

The truest friendship, is in equalitie. (*Belvedere, Spenser Soc. Pub.* 17. 94)

Cicero:

It is of the utmost importance in friendship that superior and inferior should stand on an equality. (*De Amicitia* 19. 69, Falconer, p. 179)

Edwards:

Friendship stands in true equality. (*Damon and Pithias* 1690)

Erasmus:

Amicitia aequalitas. (*Adagia, Opera Omnia,* Leyden, 1703-1706, 2. 14F)

[17] *Moralia,* tr. ed. Goodwin, Boston, 1871, 1. 473.

[18] *Damon and Pithias,* 1690. *Damon and Pithias* was a popular Elizabethan play having many elements in common with Spenser's Fourth Book.

Lyly:

Amicitia (as in old Annals we find) is *inter pares*. (*Endymion* 1. 3. 31-32)

In friendship there must be an equality of estates. (*Euphues*, ed. Croll and Clemons, 1916, p. 372)

Pettie:

In all degrees of friendship equality is chiefly considered. (*Petite Pallace*, ed. Gollancz, London, 1908, 1. 25)

Perfect love can never be without equality. (*Ibid.* 1. 166-167)

Plutarch:

Friendship . . . is a sort of harmony all of a piece, and admits not the least inequality, unlikeness, or discords of parts. (*Op. cit.* 1. 473)

Publilius Syrus:

Amicitia pares aut accipit, aut facit. (*Sentences de Publ*[*il*]*ius Syrus*, in *Bibliothèque Latine-Française*, Publiée par C. L. F. Panckoucke, Paris, 1886, p. 24)

III

Friendship Is Based on Similarity

Similarity as a basis of true friendship seems to underlie nearly every canto in the Fourth Book.[19] A striking example is the friendship of Amyas and Placidas: they are so much alike that one of them substitutes for the other without being detected. In regard to these loyal friends Spenser says (4. 8. 55):

Neuer two so like did liuing creature see.[20]

In this episode Spenser may be considering the substitution motif only, and may therefore have no thought of similarity as a basis of friendship; but such an interpretation is doubtful. The episode was probably written under the direct influence

[19] In *An Hymne in Honour of Beautie* Spenser predicates similarity as a necessary basis of friendship:

> Loue is a celestiall harmonie,
> Of likely harts.
> (197-198)

For a discussion of the kinship between the Fourth Book and the first two *Hymnes* see pp. 5-6, 55-67.

[20] Cf. *F. Q.* 4. 8. 56-58; 4. 9. 10-11.

of Edwards' *Damon and Pithias* and the medieval romance *Amis and Amiloun*. The friendship of Damon and Pithias, as well as that of Amis and Amiloun, " of likeness of manners, took root." [21] Doubtless the friendship of Amyas and Placidas had a similar beginning.

That friendship is based on similarity is definitely reflected in Spenser's portrayal of false friendship. He makes it explicit in regard to Ate and Blandamour, and Duessa and Paridel—the chief pairs of false friends delineated in the Fourth Book: they were " companions of like qualitie " (4. 1. 32), he says.

This theory is widely disseminated in both classical and Renaissance literature. One of the chief questions in Plato's *Lysis* is whether the like is the friend of the like. Although, as in all of Plato's dialogues, no final conclusion is reached, the question is tacitly answered in the affirmative. In several other connections Plato considers similarity fundamental to friendship, as for example in the *Phaedrus*: " The old proverb says that ' birds of a feather flock together '; . . . and similarity begets friendship." [22] According to Cicero, " nothing so allures and attracts anything to itself as likeness does to friendship." [23] " Real friendship," avers Plutarch, " has always its origin from likeness. For, we may observe, even brute and inanimate beings affect their like, very readily mixing and uniting with those of their own nature; while with great reluctance and a kind of indignation they shrink from and avoid whatever differs from themselves." He emphasizes that " the resemblance betwixt friends must be far more than skin-deep, must be substantial." [24] Castiglione says " reason willeth, that such as are coupled in strayte amitie, and unspeakable company, should be also alike in will, in minde, in judgement, and inclination. . . . For it seemeth by nature, that every thing doeth willingly felowshippe with his like." [25] " Betwene all men that be good," Elyot maintains, " can nat all way be

[21] Richard Edwards, *Damon and Pithias* 321. Cf. Ayres, " The *Faerie Queene* and *Amis and Amiloun*," *MLN* 23 (1908). 177-180.

[22] *Phaedrus* 240, Jowett, 3rd. ed., 1. 445.

[23] *De Amicitia* 13. 50, Falconer, p. 161.

[24] *Moralia*, ed. Goodwin, 1. 472-473.

[25] *Courtier*, tr. Hoby, Everyman ed., p. 119.

amitie, but it also requireth that they be of semblable or moche like maners." [26] In *Damon and Pithias* the proverb, "*Morum similitudo consuit amicitias*," [27] is stressed. By way of illustration of its prevalence in Spenser's time and in the classical literature available to him, typical expressions of this proverbial idea are subjoined.

Aristotle:

Some define it [friendship] as a matter of similarity; they say that we love those who are like ourselves: whence the proverbs 'Like finds his like,' 'Birds of a feather flock together,' and so on. (*N. Eth.* 8. 1, Rackham, p. 453)

Empedocles . . . declares that 'Like seeks after like.' (*Ibid.* 8. 1, p. 455)

The perfect form of friendship is that between the good, and those who resemble each other in virtue. (*Ibid.* 8. 3, p. 461)

'Two of an age agree.' (*Ibid.* 8. 12, p. 501)

Like is the friend of like. (*Ibid.* 9. 3, p. 531)

Does friendship exist among the like, as is thought and said? For 'Jackdaw sits by jackdaw,' as the proverb has it, and

'Unto the like God ever brings the like.' (*Magna Moralia* 1208[b] 7-10, Ross, Vol. 9)

Castiglione:

Reason willeth, that such as are coupled in strayte amitie, and unspeakable company, should be also alike in will, in minde, in judgement, and inclination. (*Op. cit.* p. 119)

It seemeth by nature, that every thing doeth willingly felowshippe with his like. (*Ibid.* p. 119)

Edwards:

They say *Morum similitudo consuit amicitias.* (*Damon and Pithias* 102)

[Friendship between Damon and Pithias] Of likeness of manners, took root by company, and now is conserved by virtue. (*Ibid.* 321)

Elyot:

Betwene all men that be good can nat all way be amitie, but it also requireth that they be of semblable or moche like maners. (*Op. cit.* 2. 123-124)

Empedocles:

All things that are more adapted for mixture are like to one

[26] *Op. cit.* 2. 123-124. [27] Line 102.

another and united in love by Aphrodite. ("Poem on Nature," Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, 3rd ed., London, 1920, p. 209)

Homer:

Unto the like God ever brings the like. (*Odyssey* 17. 218)

Lyly:

Doth not the sympathy of manners make the conjunction of minds? Is it not a byword, like will to like? (*Euphues*, ed. cit., p. 29)

The friendship between man and man . . . proceedeth of the similitude of manners. (*Ibid.*, p. 78)

Between the similitude of manners there is a friendship. (*Ibid.*, p. 274)

In friendship there must be . . . a similitude of manners. (*Ibid.*, p. 372)

Pettie:

I think love chiefly to be grounded upon the similitude of manners. (*Op. cit.* 1. 137)

Plato:

The poets . . . are to us in a manner the fathers and authors of wisdom, and they speak of friends in no light or trivial manner, but God himself, as they say, makes them and draws them to one another; and this they express, if I am not mistaken, in the following words: — 'God is ever drawing like towards like, and making them acquainted.' (*Lysis* 213-4, Jowett, 3rd ed., 1. 62)

The good are like one another, and friends to one another. *Ibid.* 214, 1. 63)

Those who say that the like is friendly to the like mean to intimate, if I rightly apprehend them, that the good only is the friend of the good, and of him only; but that the evil never attains to any real friendship either with good or evil. (*Ibid.* 214, 1. 63)

The old proverb says that 'birds of a feather flock together' . . . and similarity begets friendship. (*Phaedrus* 240, Jowett 1. 445)

Like to like, as the proverb says. (*Symposium* 195, Jowett 1. 565)

To me every man appears to be most the friend of him who is most like to him—like to like, as ancient sages say. (*Gorgias* 510, Jowett 2. 402)

The friendship which arises from contraries is horrible and coarse, and has often no tie of communion; but that which arises from likeness is gentle, and has a tie of communion which lasts through life. (*Laws* 8. 837, Jowett 5. 219)

Plutarch:

Real friendship has always its origin from likeness. (*Op. cit.* 1. 472)

As for friendship, that is a sort of harmony all of a piece, and admits not the least inequality, unlikeness, or discords of parts. (1. 473)

The resemblance betwixt friends must be far more than skin-deep, must be substantial, such as may be traced in every action of their lives, in all their affections, dispositions, words and purposes, even to their most retired thoughts. (1. 473)

Friendship generally takes its rise from a conformity of tempers and dispositions. (2. 106)

Wyatt:

Like to like, the proverbe saieth. (*Poems*, ed. Foxwell, London, 1913, 1. 104)

IV

Friends Have But One Soul

That there is but one soul in true friendship is taken for granted by Spenser. He says that Agape's three sons—Priamond, Diamond, and Triamond—were "all three as one" (4. 2. 41) and that

> These three did loue each other dearely well,
> And with so firme affection were allyde,
> As if but one soule in them all did dwell.[28]
> (4. 2. 43)

Of all the observations about Spenser's conception of friendship perhaps the most discerning is Upton's, who, in commenting on this passage, said: "This is the moral and allegory of the fable, thus covertly mentioned by our poet according to his manner. There is but *one soul* in true love and friendship." [29] When Priamond is killed, his soul unites with Diamond's, and when Diamond is killed, his soul unites with Triamond's. The following passage from a discourse on love by Ficino is illuminating with reference to this episode:

O twice happy death that art followed by two lives! O marvellous contract whereby a man giveth himself in exchange for another, and gaineth another, and loseth not himself! O inesti-

[28] Cf. *F. Q.* 2. 4. 19: "Loue that two harts makes one, makes eke one will."
[29] Todd, *Works of Edmund Spenser*, London, 1805, 5. 192.

mable advantage when two become one in such wise that each of them, instead of one, becometh two, and he who had but one life, undergoing death, gaineth a twofold life, seeing that dying but once he is twice raised, so that without doubt he gaineth two lives for one, and for himself, two selves![30]

That friends have but one soul was considered proverbial as early as Aristotle's time.[31] Plato of course had already given attention to the idea.[32] In England in the latter half of the sixteenth century it was not only widely proverbial but was even used as a conceit.[33]

Like the other proverbial ideas examined in this study, this idea of one soul in true friendship is mirrored in the episodes where false, as well as true, friendship is portrayed. In fact, it is explicitly referred to. Blandamour and Paridel, two false friends who play a prominent rôle in the Fourth Book,

> each to other did his faith engage,
> Like faithfull friends thenceforth to ioyne in one.
> (4. 2. 28)

What Spenser says in regard to three of the rivers attending the marriage of the Thames and the Medway is not incidental but highly significant:

> All which long sundred, doe at last accord
> To ioyne in one, ere to the sea they come,
> So flowing all from one, all one at last become.
> (4. 11. 43)

Much of the otherwise apparently trifling symbolism of the Fourth Book affords evidence that Spenser meant to base friendship on this principle. For example, Cambina, who makes peace between Cambel and her brother Triamond, carried "in her right hand a rod of peace"—a symbol of friendship—

[30] *Sopra lo Amore,* Orazione ii, cap. 8. Cited and translated by Raleigh in his Introduction to Hoby's translation of the *Courtier,* Tudor Translations, London, 1900, p. lxxvi. Raleigh says this extract "may be matched fifty times over from discourses of the Renaissance upon love."

[31] See group of proverbs appended below, pp. 39-42.

[32] *Symposium, passim.*

[33] Cf. Drayton's *Idea,* Sonnet 11 (*Spenser Soc. Pub.* 46. 382).

About the which two Serpents weren wound,
Entrayled mutually in louely lore,
And by the tailes together firmely bound,
And both were with one oliue garland crownd.
(4. 3. 42)

Again, symbolism of the unifying power of friendship is present in the statue of Venus, who was the ultimate source of true love and concord. In regard to the statue the poet says that

both her feete and legs together twyned
Were with a snake, whose head and tail were fast combyned.
(4. 10. 40)

These lines are not mere embellishment; they echo one of the rudimentary ideas in Spenser's theory of friendship.

Thus, the conception that friends have but one soul is pervasive throughout the Fourth Book and alone is sufficient to show that Spenser was presenting friendship primarily as a virtue and not as a mere social relation. The following examples show that the idea was widely proverbial:

St. Ailred:

Amicitia . . . efficiuntur unum de pluribus. (*De Spirituali Amicitia*, Migne, *Patrologiae* 195, col. 663)

Aristotle:

All the proverbs agree with this; for example, 'Friends have one soul between them,' 'Friends' goods are common property,' 'Friendship is equality,' 'The knee is nearer than the shin.' (*N. Eth.* 9. 8. 2, Rackham, pp. 549-551)

According to the proverb—when we wish to describe a very great friend, we say 'my soul and his are one.' (*Magna Moralia* 1211^{a} 32-34)

We say about friendship such things as that friendship is equality, and true friends a single soul. (*Ethica Eudemia* 1240^{b} 1-3)

Bodenham:

The summe of friendship is, that of two soules
One should be made, in will and firme affect.
(*Op. cit.*, p. 94)

Brome:

O, ye Gods!
Why made ye them two persons, and assign'd
To both but one inseparable mind?
(*Love-Sick Court* 1. 2, *Dramatic Works*, London, 1873, 2. 105)

Tho but one can be possess'd of me
One friendship, yet, must marry us all three.
(*Ibid.* 3. 3, p. 130)

Cicero:

By the law of his nature, is this the case with man who both loves himself and uses his reason to seek out another whose soul he may so mingle with his own as almost to make one out of two. (*De Amicitia* 21. 81, Falconer, p. 189)

The effect of friendship is to make, as it were, one soul out of many. (*Ibid.* 25. 92, p. 199)

Davies:

Concord . . . many hearts . . . doth compound in one. (*Orchestra, Complete Poems*, ed. Grosart, 1. 202-203)

Edwards:

Like brother and brother,
They are knit in true friendship the one with the other.
(*Damon and Pithias* 192-193)
They have but one heart between them. (*Ibid.* 242)
For why is it said, *Amicus alter ipse*,
But that true friends should be two in body,
but one in mind,
As it were, one transformed into another?
(*Ibid.* 332-334)
My friend and I are but one. (*Ibid.* 896)
In two bodies they have but one heart. (*Ibid.* 1418)

Elyot:

Frendshippe . . . is a blessed and stable connexion of sondrie willes, makinge of two parsones one. (*Op. cit.* 2. 129)

Erasmus:

Alexander esteemed Hephaestion a second Alexander, according to the proverb, *Amicus alter ipse*, that is, two friends are one soul and one body. (*Erasmus' Apophthegms*, tr. Udall, 1542 [Boston and Lincolnshire, 1877], p. 233)

Fletcher and Massinger:

Can Heaven be pleas'd with these things?
To see two hearts that have been twin'd together
Married in friendship, to the world a wonder,
Of one growth, of one nourishment, one health,
Thus mortally divorc'd for one weak woman?
(*Lover's Progress* 2. 3, *Works of Beaumont and Fletcher*, ed. Dyce, New York, 1879, 11. 55)

Gower:

> Geta and Amphitrion,
> . . . weren bothe as on
> Of frendschipe and of compaignie.
> (*Confessio Amantis* 2. 2459-2461)

Greene:

It [love] doth knit the mindes of friends together with such perfect and perpetuall amitie, as wee may iustly say with *Socrates*, they be two bodies and one soule. (*Morando: The Tritameron of Loue, Works*, ed. Grosart, 3. 89)

Socrates also saide, that the ende of friendshippe was, that of two soules one shoulde bee made, in will and affection. (*Ibid.* 3. 146)

Grimald:

> Behold thy frend, and of thy self the pattern see:
> One soull, a wonder shall it seem, in bodies twain to bee.
> ("Of frendship," *Tottel's Miscellany*, ed. Rollins, p. 106)

Kyd:

What are friends but one minde in two bodies? (*Soliman and Perseda* 4. 1. 30)

Lodge:

There seemed to bee one soule in two bodyes, one heart in two harboures. (*Euphues Shadow, Works*, Glasgow, 1883, 2. 18)

Lorris and Clopinel:

> So powerful are the cords that bind
> Two men whose bodies hold one mind.
> (*Romance of the Rose*, tr. Ellis, London, 1926, 2. 31)

Lydgate:

> So ful they were of oon accordement,
> As oon in too and too in oon for euere,
> That nought, but deth, her loue may disseuere.
> (*Fabula Duorum Mercatorum* 96-98)

Massinger:

Though two bodies, friends have but one soul. (*A Very Woman* 2. 1, *Plays*, ed. Gifford, London, 1813, 4. 256)

Montaigne:

Those we ordinarily call friends and amities, are but acquaintances and familiarities, tied together by some occasion or commodities, by meanes whereof our mindes are entertained. In the

amitie I speake of, they entermixe and confound themselves one in the other, with so universall a commixture, that they weare out, and can no more finde the seame that hath conjoyned them together. (*Op. cit.* 1. 202)

Painter:

[Two friends] from the tyme of theyr youthe lyved in sutche great and perfect amitie, as there was betwene them but one harte, one bed, one house, one table, and one purse. Long time continued this perfect frendship: betwene whom there was but one will and one woorde, no difference in either of them: in so muche as they not onely semed to be two brethren, but also they appeared in al semblances to be but one man. ("Of a Ialouse Gentleman," *Palace of Pleasure*, ed. Jacobs, 1890, 2. 104)

Plutarch:

Single friendship by kind discourses and good offices cements, unites, and condenses as it were two parties. (*Op. cit.* 1. 469)

Two friends, though severed in body, yet have their souls joined and as it were melted together, and neither desire to be two nor believe themselves to be separate persons. (*Op. cit.* 4. 301)

Shakespeare:

I being pent in thee,
Perforce am thine and all that is in me.
(Sonnet 133, *Sonnets*, ed. Alden, p. 321)

My friend and I are one. (Sonnet 42, *ibid.*, p. 114)

Thou and I am one. (*As You Like It* 1. 3. 99)

Sidney:

Joyne hearts and hands, so let it be,
Make but one minde in bodies three.
("Two Pastorels," *Works*, ed. Feuillerat, 2. 325)

Warner:

In perfect friendship no suspect, for two in one are all. (*Englands Parnassus*, ed. Crawford, p. 83)

Woodes:

We two in friendship are united as one. (*Conflict of Conscience*, Dodsley, *Old Plays* 6. 60)

V

A Friend Is a Second Self

The proverbial idea that a friend is a second self is closely related to the theory that a person can have but one genuine friend—a theory that seems to be reflected throughout the Fourth Book. The examples of friendship Spenser cites as ideal are classical—always pairs: Hercules and Hylas, Jonathan and David, Theseus and Pirithous, Titus and Gesippus, Damon and Pithias.[34] Likewise, in all the chief examples of friendship—both true and false—which Spenser portrays, friends are reckoned in pairs:[35] Cambel and Triamond, Amyas and Placidas, Britomart and Amoret, Marinel and Florimel, Scudamour and Amoret, Ate and Duessa, Blandamour and Paridel. This phenomenon is highly significant: it shows that Spenser was not depicting friendship purely as a social relation; it also undoubtedly reflects a theory of friendship of which the proverbial idea that a friend is a second self is part and parcel.

According to Plato, each person is hunting his "other half," his "other self." When the two halves find each other, their souls unite, resulting in perfect friendship.[36] This theory is consonant with the hypothesis that the proverbial ideas that a friend is a second self and that friends become one in soul both underlie Spenser's conception. Explanation of his employment of these two ideas is found, in part at least, in the fact that they express different aspects of the same principle, shown by the frequent citing of one of them to prove the other. For example, Elyot says "a frende is proprely named of Philosophers the other I. For that in them is but one mynde."[37] In *Damon and Pithias* the same thought is emphasized:

[34] *F. Q.* 4. 10. 27. Cf. 4. 4. 14; 4. 9. 17; 4. 10. 25.

[35] The example of Agape's three sons—Priamond, Diamond, and Triamond—is an exception; but, it should be remembered that in this exception the friendship is limited to *three*, that they have the advantage of being brothers, and that Spenser is here illustrating the unifying power of friendship.

[36] Cf. *Symposium* 190 ff.

[37] *Op. cit.* 2. 130. Cf. Castiglione, *op. cit.*, p. 120: "I allow well that this knot, which is so strayte, knit or binde no moe than two, els were it in hazarde."

> For why is it said, *Amicus alter ipse,*
> But that true friends should be two in body,
> but one in mind.
> (332-333)

Compare also a remark by Erasmus: "Alexander esteemed Hephaestion a second Alexander, according to the proverb, *Amicus alter ipse,* that is, two friends are one soul and one body." [38] The examples of this proverb appended below might, therefore, have been included with those expressing the thought that in true friendship there is one soul. But, for the sake of clarity, and in order rightly to emphasize their possible influence on the Fourth Book, they are given here in a separate group.

Anonymous:

> In wealth and wo thy frend, an other self to thee,
> Such man to man a God, the prouerb sayth to be.
> ("The praise of a true frende," *Tottel's Miscellany,* ed. Rollins, p. 245)

I loved thee as my second self. (*A Knack to Know a Knave,* Dodsley, *Old Plays* 6. 526)

Aristotle:

A friend is another self. (*N. Eth.* 9. 4., Rackham, p. 535)

A friend . . . is a second self. (*Ibid.* 9. 9, p. 557)

One could see the nature and attributes of the friend, . . . such as to be a second self, at least if you make a very great friend, as the saying has it, 'Here is another Heracles, a dear other self.' (*Magna Moralia* 1213ª 10-14)

The friend is, as we assert, a second self. (*Ibid.* 1213ª 23-24)

A friend wants to be, in the words of the proverb, 'another Heracles,' 'a second self.' (*Ethica Eudemia* 1245ª 29-30)

Bacon:

It was a Sparing Speech of the Ancients, to say, *That a Frend is another Himself.* ("Of Frendship," *Essays,* ed. Wright, London, 1899, p. 114)

Cicero:

He who looks upon a true friend, looks, as it were, upon a sort of image of himself. (*De Amicitia* 7. 23, Falconer, p. 133)

The real friend . . . is, as it were, another self. (*Ibid.* 21. 80, p. 189)

[38] *Erasmus' Apophthegms,* tr. cit., p. 233.

I am blaming myself far more than you, and you only as my second self. (*Letters to Atticus*, tr. Winstedt, Loeb Classical Library, 1. 227)

He asked for a committee of fifteen, naming me at the head of them and saying that I should count as his second self in everything. (*Ibid.* 1. 263)

Diogenes Laertius:

To the question "who is a friend?" his answer was, "A second self (*alter ego*)." (*Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, tr. Hicks, Loeb Classical Library, 2. 135)

Edwards:

For why is it said, *Amicus alter ipse*,
But that true friends should be two in body,
but one in mind,
As it were, one transformed into another?
(*Damon and Pithias* 332-334)

My Damon, another myself. (*Ibid.* 637)

Elyot:

A frende is proprely named of Philosophers the other I. For that in them is but one mynde. (*Op. cit.* 2. 130)

Erasmus:

Amicus alter ipse. (*Adagia*, *Opera Omnia*, ed. cit. 2. 14F)

Alexander esteemed Hephaestion a second Alexander, according to the proverb, *Amicus alter ipse*, that is, two friends are one soul and one body. (*Apophthegms*, tr. cit., p. 233)

Gower:

Ambroise dist en son decré:
'Mon bon amy est l'autre jé.'
(*Mirour de l'Omme* 13732-13733)

Greene:

A friend is a same selfe. (*Morando*: *The Tritameron of Loue*, *Works*, ed. Grosart, 3. 147)

He was my second selfe. (*Philomela*: *The Lady Fitzwaters Nightingale*, *Works*, 11. 165)

Lyly:

A friend is . . . at all times another I. (*Euphues*, ed. cit., p. 28)

Marlowe:

Why should'st thou kneel? Know'st thou not who I am?
Thy friend, thyself, another Gaveston!
(*Edward II* 1. 1. 142-143)

Come near, my love; come near, thy master's life.
My trusty servant, nay, my second self.
(*Jew of Malta* 3. 4. 14-15)

Pettie:

Of all griefs it is most griping when friends are forced to part each from other, . . . when own's self is separated from himself, or at least his second self. (*Op. cit.* 1. 157)

Plato:

One with you in friendship . . . your second self. (*Parmenides* 128, Jowett 4. 47)

Plutarch:

We usually esteem a friend another self. (*Op. cit.* 1. 465)

Rolle:

Mihi est ille alius ego. (*Incendium Amoris*, ed. Deanesley, *Pub. Univ. of Manchester, Hist. Ser.* 26. 263)

Shakespeare:

And I my selfe am morgag'd to thy will,
My selfe Ile forfeit, so that other mine,
Thou wilt restore to be my comfort still.
(Sonnet 134, Alden, p. 322)

Withals:

I use my friend as I use myself: *Amicus alter ipse est.* (*Dictionary in English and Latin* [London, 1521], 1616 ed., p. 552)

VI

False Friendship Cannot Last

Spenser believed that there can be no lasting friendship among the wicked and the evil-minded and that friendship among such will turn to hatred—a principle stressed throughout the Fourth Book and one for which Spenser had ample precedent. In the *Phaedrus* Plato says "fate . . . has ordained that there shall be no friendship among the evil,"[39] and in the *Lysis* he emphasizes the same thought: "The good only is the friend of the good, and of him only; but . . . the evil never attains to any real friendship, either with good or

[39] *Phaedrus* 255, Jowett 1. 462.

evil." [40] That lasting "friendship cannot exist except among good men" is considered axiomatic by Cicero.[41] In pointing out the importance of friendship as a virtue Castiglione lays emphasis on the doctrine that "the friendshippe of the wicked, is no friendship." [42] Likewise, Elyot in the *Governour* affirms that "Frendship may nat be but betwene good men." [43] It is elemental in the plot of Edwards' *Damon and Pithias*: "Where virtue doth not knit the knot, there friendship cannot reign." [44] The prominence of this idea in the Fourth Book is illustrated by the following:

> So mortall was their malice and so sore,
> Become of fayned friendship which they vow'd afore.
> (4. 2. 18)
> And friendship, which a faint affection breeds
> Without regard of good, dyes like ill grounded seeds.
> (4. 4. 1)
> But sooth is said, and tride in each degree,
> Faint friends when they fall out, most cruell fomen bee.
> (4. 9. 27)

These are some of Spenser's more proverb-like expressions of this doctrine.[45] That it was sententious and commonplace is shown by the examples given below. Spenser's indebtedness to this body of material is evident.

Aristotle:

Friendship based on virtue is proof against calumny, and permanent, while the others quickly change. (*N. Eth.* 8. 6, Rackham, p. 477)

Friendship based on virtue does not give rise to quarrels. (*Ibid.* 9. 1, p. 521)

Time is said to show the friend. (*Ethica Eudemia*, 1238[a] 14)

Castiglione:

The friendshippe of the wicked, is no friendship. (*Op. cit.*, p. 120)

[40] *Lysis* 214, Jowett 1. 63.
[41] *De Amicitia*, ed. Falconer, p. 127.
[42] *Courtier*, tr. Hoby, Everyman, p. 120.
[43] *Op. cit.* 2. 165.
[44] Line 1746.
[45] Cf. *F. Q.* 4. 2. 29; 4. 4. 1. In 4. 2. 29 there is an explicit reference to proverbial fair-weather friendship. See Horace, *Odes* 1. 35. 26; Ovid, *Tristia* 1. 3. 15-16; 1. 5. 33; 1. 9. 5-14; Gray, *Hymn to Adversity* 22.

Cicero:

Friendship cannot exist except among good men. (*De Amicitia* 5. 18, Falconer, p. 127)

If you remove goodwill from friendship the very name of friendship is gone. (*Ibid.* 5. 19-20, p. 129)

In friendship there is nothing false, nothing pretended. (*Ibid.* 8. 26, p. 139)

Nothing is to be considered a greater bane of friendship than fawning, cajolery, or flattery; . . . a vice peculiar to fickle and falsehearted men. (*Ibid.* 25. 91, p. 199)

Hypocrisy is not only wicked under all circumstances, because it pollutes truth and takes away the power to discern it, but it is also especially inimical to friendship, since it utterly destroys sincerity, without which the word friendship can have no meaning. (*Ibid.* 25. 92, p. 199)

Edwards:

> But such as for profit in friendship do link,
> When storms come they slide away sooner than a man will think.
>
> (*Damon and Pithias* 326-327)

No friendship is sure but that which is grounded on virtue. (*Ibid.* 329)

There is no friendship but between honest men. (*Ibid.* 1411)

That is no friendship, but a lewd liking; it lasts but a while. (*Ibid.* 1414)

Where virtue doth not knit the knot, there friendship cannot reign. (*Ibid.* 1746)

> Wo worthe the fainyng looks, one fauour that doe waite,
> Wo worthe the fained frendly harte, that harbours depe deceit.
>
> ("Evil to Him that Evil Thinketh," *Paradise of Dainty Devices*, ed. Rollins, p. 61)

Greene:

The difference betweene true and fained freendship, the one beeing momentarie, depending on the fauour of Fortune, the other perpetual, which stretcheth *usque ad Aras.* (*Royal Exchange*, *Works*, ed. Grosart, 7. 243)

Hunis:

> O flatterer false, thou traitor borne, what mischief more might thou deuise,
> Then thy deare frende, to haue in scorne, and hym to wounde in sondrie wise:
> Which still a frende pretends to be, and art not so by profe I se.

Fie fie, vpon suche trechery.
("The fruites of fained frendes," *Paradise of Dainty Devices*, ed. Rollins, p. 65)

Kendall:

Most sure a wretched foe is he,
whiche frendship firme doeth faine:
And sekes by all the shifts he can,
his frende to put to paine.
("Fayned frendship," *Flovvers of Epigrammes, Spenser Soc. Pub.* 15. 139)

Marston:

Who cannot feign friendship can ne'er produce the effects of hatred. (*The Malcontent*, 1. 7. 77-78)

Plato:

The bad, as is often said of them, are never at unity with one another or with themselves; for they are passionate and restless, and anything which is at variance and enmity with itself is not likely to be in union or harmony with any other thing. (*Lysis* 214, Jowett 1. 63)

The evil never attains to any real friendship, either with good or evil. (*Ibid.* 214, 1. 63)

Nothing can be the friend of the bad. (*Ibid.* 216, 1. 66)

Fate . . . has ordained that there shall be no friendship among the evil. (*Phaedrus* 255, 1. 462)

Evil is the vulgar lover who loves the body rather than the soul, inasmuch as he is not even stable, because he loves a thing which is in itself unstable, and therefore when the bloom of youth which he was desiring is over, he takes wing and flies away, in spite of all his words and promises. (*Symposium* 183, 1. 553)

Shakespeare:

The amity that wisdom knits not, folly may easily untie. (*Troilus and Cressida* 2. 3. 110-111)

Warner:

A feeble frend may proue thy strongest foe. (*Englands Parnassus*, ed. Crawford, p. 83)

Wyatt:

Fortunes frend is myshappes ffoo. (*Op. cit.* 1. 103)

VII

Friends' Goods Are Common Goods

Although Spenser believed that friendship is based on equality, he was far from being communistic or even democratic. An aristocratic point of view is evident in almost everything he wrote. The *Veue of the Present State of Ireland,* for example, shows that he was not in the least socialistic.[46] The account of the giant with the scales (*F. Q.* 5. 2) also reveals his opposition to communistic doctrine. His theory of friendship is based on no principle of leveling down: in portraying true friendship he does not use the proverbial idea that friends' goods are common goods. It is highly significant that this idea is employed in his delineation of false friendship only. In remonstrating with Blandamour, Paridel says:

> Well know'st thou, when we friendship first did sweare,
> The couenant was, that euery spoyle or pray
> Should equally be shard betwixt vs tway.
>
> (4. 2. 13)

Had Spenser believed in this doctrine, doubtless he would have made use of it in picturing ideal friendship. He was acquainted with classical literature that was full of it. Curiously enough, whenever in Renaissance English literature this theory is referred to, it is usually disapproved.[47] Perhaps this is accounted for by the fact that communistic theory was taboo in England in the sixteenth century. Some of the more significant occurrences of this proverbial idea are given below.

Aristotle:

> The proverb says 'Friends' goods are common property,' and this is correct, since community is the essence of friendship. (*N. Eth.* 8. 9, Rackham, p. 485)
>
> All the proverbs agree with this; for example, 'Friends have one soul between them,' 'Friends' goods are common property,' 'Friendship is equality,' 'The knee is nearer than the shin.' (*Ibid.* 9. 8, pp. 549-551)
>
> The proverbial 'community among friends.' (*Ethica Eudemia,* 1237^{b} 33-34, Ross, Vol. 9)

[46] Cf. Greenlaw, "Spenser and British Imperialism," *MP* 9 (1912). 347-370.
[47] Cf. Mills, "The Meaning of *Edward II*," *MP* 32 (1934). 19-20.

Bodenham:

Foure things we ought supply our friend withall:
Our person, counsell, comfort, and our goods.
(" Of Friendship, and Friends," *op cit.* p. 96)

Erasmus:

Amicorum communia omnia. (*Adagia, op. cit.* 2. 14F)

Fulwood:

The benefites of fortune are common amongst friendes. (*Enemie of Idlenesse*, Apperson, *English Proverbs and Proverbial Phrases*, p. 10)

Lodge:

There seemed to bee one soule in two bodyes, one heart in two harboures, neither separated, at boorde, nor seuered at bed. (*Euphues Shadow, Works*, Glasgow, 1883, 2. 18)

Lyly:

All things went in common between them; which all men counted commendable. (*Euphues*, ed. cit., p. 31)

Montaigne:

All things being by effect common betweene them; wils, thoughts, judgements, goods, wives, children, honour, and life. (" Of Friendship," *op. cit.* 1. 205)

We were copartners in all things. All things were with us at halfe. (*Op cit.* 1. 208)

François de la Noue:

Toutes choses sont communes entre amis. (*Discours*, p. 513. See Jones, *Spenser's Defense of Lord Grey, Univ. of Ill. Studies in Lang. and Lit.*, p. 28)

Painter:

[Two friends] from the tyme of theyr youthe lyued in sutche great and perfect amitie, as there was betwene them but one harte, one bed, one house, one table, and one purse. . . . their goodes were common betwene them. (" Of a Ialouse Gentleman," *op. cit.* 2. 104)

Plato:

Friends have all things in common. (*Lysis* 207, Jowett 1. 54; *Republic* 5. 449, Jowett 3. 140; *Laws* 5. 739, Jowett 5. 121)

Friends should have all things in common. (*Phaedrus* 279, Jowett 1. 489)

Plutarch:

All things ought to be in common amongst friends. (*Op. cit.* 2. 136)

Rivers:

He . . . loued aswele to do good to his frendes as to him self, sayng the goodis of frendes ought to be comyn. (*Dictes and Sayings*, Apperson, *op. cit.*, p. 10)

Surrey:

Than gan I thus resolue, "More pleasant is the lyef
Of faythefull frends that spend their goods in commone,
with out stryef."
(*Poems*, ed. Padelford, p. 88)

Terence:

It's an old saying that friends have all things in common. (*The Brothers*, tr. Sargeaunt, Loeb Classical Library, 2. 273; cf. Apperson, *op. cit.*, p. 10)

Woodes:

Inter amicos omnia sunt communia, they say: Among friends there is reckoned no property. (*Conflict of Conscience*, Dodsley, *Old Plays* 6. 60)

In bringing together the results of this investigation of the sententious element in Spenser's conception of friendship, several observations emerge. Of chief importance is the fact that proverbial ideas hold a distinct place in his theory. Underlying the main incidents in the Fourth Book, they afford the necessary basis required by the conception of friendship symphonically elaborated in the book as a whole. Spenser is eclectic in his use of proverbial wisdom about friendship. Unlike many of his contemporaries who seem to have employed proverbs largely as an ornamental device—Lyly for example—Spenser makes proverbial ideas about friendship an integral part of his conception. Although the Fourth Book has no synthesizing emblem-knight, it is a complex organic unit. The numerous proverbial phrase-tags about friendship in both the classical and the Renaissance literature with which Spenser was acquainted he has not used as embellishing material: in point of fact, there are almost none of these tags in the entire Fourth Book. Of all the virtues celebrated in the

Faerie Queene, however, apparently friendship is unique in that vital aspects of it alone are proverbial.

Although widely disseminated in Renaissance literature, the ideas underlying Spenser's theory of friendship are classical in their provenience. They are part and parcel of the concept of friendship as a virtue—a Greek idea. Spenser does not portray friendship as a mere social relation: not a single episode in the Fourth Book seems to be designed to illustrate such a conception. Following the classical models, he portrays ideal friendship as existing between two persons only. He believed that true friendship is based on equality, but he was thinking primarily of spiritual, not of political and economic, equality. The proverbial classical doctrine that friends' goods are common goods he rejected probably because it suggested communistic leveling—a theory contrary to his political bias.

Finally, this study breaks new ground: it reveals that the revival of proverbial wisdom in Renaissance England was a diffused humanism. Apparently the Elizabethans did not read the classics primarily for aesthetic pleasure, or for literary "standards," but for moral truth—a point of view consonant with the widespread interest in proverb lore in Old and Middle English times. *Beowulf,* the works of Alfred, and the poetry of Chaucer afford well known illustrations of such an interest.

IV

THE ETHICAL ALLEGORY OF THE TWO FLORIMELS

In an effort to throw some new light on the ethical allegory of Spenser's two Florimels,[1] this chapter attempts to show: first, that the true Florimel, symbolizing true beauty, which has its source in a beautiful soul, arouses noble desires in noble minds (alone able to distinguish between true and false beauty) and stirs up sensual desires in base minds, blinded by lust; second, that the false Florimel, symbolizing false beauty, which is merely physical, appeals to base minds only and therefore never begets virtuous love or true friendship. This complex theory of love and beauty is stressed in Spenser's first two *Hymnes*[2] and is elaborated by Castiglione in the concluding book of the *Courtier*, where he contends that "Love is nothing else but a certaine coveting to enjoy beautie,"[3] a doctrine, as he develops it, with three significant aspects:

1. True beauty is based on goodness:

The beautie that we meane, which is onely it, that appeareth in bodies, and especially in the face of man, and moveth this fervent coveting which we call Love, we will terme it an influence of the heavenly bountifulnesse.[4]

Beautie commeth of God, and is like a circle, the goodnesse whereof is the Centre. And therefore, as there can be no circle without a centre, no more can beautie be without goodnesse.

[1] *Faerie Queene*, Books III, IV, and V.

[2] Cf. *HHL* ll. 169-182, and *HHB* ll. 148-156; also *F. Q.* 3. 5. 1, and 4. 8. 32, choruslike passages bearing directly on the ethical allegory of the two Florimels.

[3] *Courtier*, Hoby's translation, Everyman ed., p. 303. Spenser's probable indebtedness to Castiglione is a matter of common knowledge. R. W. Lee, "Castiglione's Influence on Spenser's Early Hymns," *PQ* 7 (1928). 65-77, has attempted to show that much of the language of the first two *Hymnes* is influenced by Hoby's translation. In connection with the present investigation the following studies dealing with the influence of Castiglione and other Neo-Platonists on Spenser are among the most significant: Lilian Winstanley's Introduction to her edition of Spenser's *Fowre Hymnes* (Cambridge, England, 1916); Jefferson B. Fletcher, *The Religion of Beauty in Woman* (New York, 1911); Josephine Waters Bennett, "The Theme of Spenser's *Fowre Hymnes*," *SP* 28 (1931). 18-57; Frederick Morgan Padelford, "Spenser's *Fowre Hymnes*: A Resurvey," *SP* 29 (1932). 207-232; J. S. Harrison, *Platonism in English Poetry* (New York, 1903). These studies ably survey the Platonic and Neo-Platonic background under the influence of which Spenser wrote.

[4] *Courtier*, Everyman ed., p. 304.

Whereupon doth very seldom an ill soule dwell in a beautifull bodie.[5]

Beautie is a face pleasant, merrie, comely, and to be desired for goodnesse: and foulenesse a face darke, uglesome, unpleasant, and to bee shunned for ill. And in case you will consider all thinges, ye shall find, that whatsoever is good and profitable, hath also evermore the comelinesse of beautie.[6]

Good and beautifull be after a sorte one selfe thing, especially in the bodies of men: of the beautie whereof the nighest cause (I suppose) is the beautie of the soule: the which as a partner of the right and heavenly beauty, maketh sightly and beautiful what ever she toucheth, and most of all, if the bodie, where she dwelleth, be not of so vile a matter, that she can not imprint in it her propertie.[7]

The body, where that beautie shineth, is not the fountaine from whence beautie springeth, but rather because beautie is bodilesse, and (as wee have saide) an heavenly shining beame, she loseth much of her honour when she is coupled with that vile subject and full of corruption.[8]

The bodie is a most diverse thing from beautie.[9]

2. True beauty inspires true love, but may arouse lustful desires in base minds:

Beautie is good, and consequently the true love of it is most good and holy, and evermore bringeth forth good fruites in the soules of them, that with the bridle of reason restraine the ill disposition of sense.[10]

It is possible also to finde in the world beautifull women unchaste, yet not because beautie inclineth them to unchaste living, for it rather plucketh them from it, and leadeth them into the way of vertuous conditions, through the affinitie that beautie hath with goodnesse.[11]

Who so thinketh in possessing the bodie to enjoy Beautie, he is farre deceived, and is moved to it, not with true knowledge by the choice of reason, but with false opinion by the longing of sense.[12]

3. False beauty arouses lustful desires in base minds only:

It chanceth also oftentimes, that as to other senses, so the sight is deceived, and judgeth a face beautifull, which in deed is not beautifull. And because in the eyes, and in the whole countenance of some women, a man beholdeth otherwhile a certaine lavish

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 308-309.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 309.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 310.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 313.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 317.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 306.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 311.
[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 304-305.

wantonnesse painted with dishonest flickeringes, many whom that manner delighteth, because it promiseth them an easinesse to come by the thing that they covet, call it beautie: but in deede it is a cloked unshamefastnesse unworthie of so honourable and holy a name.[13]

Spenser's account of the two Florimels was written under the influence of this Neo-Platonic doctrine, and it is against this background that the present interpretation of that story is presented.

The True Florimel

In the true Florimel Spenser vividly pictures a beautiful woman whose purity of character is unassailable. Of her it is said:

> The surest signe, whereby ye may her know,
> Is, that she is the fairest wight aliue, I trow.
> . . . . . .
> That Lady is (quoth he) where so she bee,
> The bountiest virgin, and most debonaire,
> That euer liuing eye I weene did see;
> Liues none this day, that may with her compare
> In stedfast chastitie and vertue rare,
> The goodly ornaments of beautie bright;
> And is ycleped *Florimell* the faire.[14] (3. 5. 5, 8)

Her chastity and her virtuous deeds are caroled by the angels:

> Eternall thraldome was to her more liefe,
> Then losse of chastitie, or chaunge of loue:
> Die had she rather in tormenting griefe,
> Then any should of falsenesse her reproue,
> Or loosenesse, that she lightly did remoue.
> Most vertuous virgin, glory be thy meed,
> And crowne of heauenly praise with Saints aboue,
> Where most sweet hymmes of this thy famous deed
> Are still emongst them song, that far my rymes exceed.
>
> Fit song of Angels caroled to bee;
> But yet what so my feeble Muse can frame,
> Shall be t'aduance thy goodly chastitee,

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 311-312.

[14] Compare the following: *Hymne in Honour of Beautie* 139: "For all that faire is, is by nature good"; *Courtier*, ed. cit., p. 309: "As there can be no circle without a centre, no more can beautie be without goodnesse"; Buoni, *Problems of Beautie*, tr. by S. L. (London, 1606), p. 12: "Bodyly *Beauty* is a cleare signe (if Malignity bee not hidden under it) of a faire (that is) of a vertuous minde."

> And to enroll thy memorable name,
> In th'heart of euery honourable Dame,
> That they thy vertuous deedes may imitate,
> And be partakers of thy endlesse fame. (3. 8. 42-43)

She loves Marinel only and is loyal to him. In a short time after she sets out from the court of the Faerie Queene to find him, she is pursued by a lustful forester. They attract the attention of Prince Arthur, Guyon, Britomart, and Timias. Prince Arthur and Guyon hasten to her rescue while Timias pursues the forester, who tries to escape. Although Florimel sees that the forester is no longer pursuing her, because of her fright she is unable to recognize the noble intent of Prince Arthur and Guyon in their "chace of beautie excellent" (3. 4. 45):

> Aloud to her he [Arthur] oftentimes did call,
> To doe away vaine doubt, and needlesse dreed:
> Full myld to her he spake, and oft let fall
> Many meeke wordes, to stay and comfort her withall.
> But nothing might relent her hastie flight;
> So deepe the deadly feare of that foule swaine
> Was earst impressed in her gentle spright. (3. 4. 48-49)

She is thrown into many difficult situations and tempted in every way possible, but her character is invulnerable. When her beauty finally touches the heart of Marinel, he falls in love with her. Spenser makes their union a symbol of ideal friendship. Thus, the true Florimel, whose beauty "all liuing creatures did excell" (4. 12. 33), always kindles noble desires in the minds of those who recognize true beauty when they see it; Spenser vouchsafes no exceptions.[15]

Contrasted with the reaction of noble minds to Florimel's beauty is the reaction of base minds:

> The baser wit, whose idle thoughts alway
> Are wont to cleaue vnto the lowly clay,
> It stirreth vp to sensuall desire.[16] (3. 5. 1)

But the goodness and purity of her heart are inviolable.[17]

[15] Cf. *Courtier*, ed. cit., p. 306; also Plato, *Lysis* 216, Jowett, 3rd ed., 1. 65: "'The beautiful is the friend,' as the old proverb says."

[16] Cf. *Courtier*, ed. cit., pp. 304-305; also Plato, *Symposium* 183-184, Jowett, 3rd ed., 1. 553-554.

[17] Cf. *Comus* 589: "Virtue may be assailed, but never hurt."

When she attracts the attention of the lustful forester, who pursues her " Breathing out beastly lust her to defile " (3. 1. 17), she flees,

> So deepe the deadly feare of that foule swaine
> Was earst impressed in her gentle spright. (3. 4. 49)

She finds shelter in the cottage of a witch, whose boorish son thinks her " The fairest creature, that he euer saw " (3. 7. 13) and soon

> conceiu'd affection bace,
> And cast to loue her in his brutish mind;
> No loue, but brutish lust, that was so beastly tind.
> (3. 7. 15)

In order to escape the advances of this churl she slips away, and, although the witch sends after her a terrible monster, the Blatant Beast, she reaches the sea and takes refuge in a little boat in which lies a sleeping fisherman, who soon awakes. Her beauty arouses his lustful passions and he brutishly seizes her, for her beauty

> in his congealed flesh,
> Infixt such secret sting of greedy lust,
> That the drie withered stocke it gan refresh,
> And kindled heat, that soone in flame forth brust.[18]
> (3. 8. 25)

Proteus, hearing her cries, rescues her, takes her to his bower beneath the sea, and tempts her in every way possible. When neither his

> gifts nor graces kind
> Her constant mind could moue at all he saw,
> He thought her to compell by crueltie and awe. (4. 11. 2)

But neither his threats nor his allurements move her: she is steadfast in her loyalty to Marinel. Through the aid of Neptune she is finally released from the dungeon of Proteus and restored to Marinel. Their marriage is celebrated by a tourna-

[18] Compare what Spenser says in regard to the lustful Corflambo:

> For most of strength and beautie his desire
> Was spoyle to make, and wast them vnto nought,
> By casting secret flakes of lustfull fire
> From his false eyes, into their harts and parts entire.
> (4. 8. 48)

ment: the genuineness of her beauty and the purity of her character are vindicated, and she is justly awarded the golden girdle.

The foregoing incidents are the important ones in which the true Florimel figures. The significant elements in the allegory are:

1. True beauty arouses noble desires in a person whose whole nature is governed by reason.

2. True beauty stirs up lustful desires in base souls, but

3. True beauty is invulnerable.

Florimel is true beauty—beauty which has its source in a beautiful soul:

> For of the soule the bodie forme doth take:
> For soule is forme, and doth the bodie make.
> (*HHB* ll. 132-133)

The False Florimel

The false Florimel, who begins her mischief-making in the Third Book of the *Faerie Queene*, comes to the front in the Fourth Book and there plays a leading rôle. In setting forth his conception of friendship in Book Four Spenser uses a large part of his time in showing what it is not: how discord, lust, false beauty, make-believe, and the like operate against friendship.[19] The theory of true and false beauty is there made an organic part of the allegory. It is the purpose here, therefore, to show how the make-believe Florimel, the incarnation of false beauty, promotes false friendship, and how the influence of her false beauty is contrasted with the power of true beauty, which promotes true friendship, depicted in such characters as Amoret and Britomart. The false Florimel, portrayed as one of the chief forces of discord, of which Ate is the personified abstraction, is made the occasion of much of the strife stirred up by Ate, whose success in destroying friendship is due partly to the fact that her own wicked nature is concealed by "borrowed beautie" (4. 1. 31). Compare the following description of Ate and Duessa:

[19] Cf. Cicero, *De Amicitia* 7. 23 (cited by Erskine, "The Virtue of Friendship in the *Faerie Queene*," *PMLA* 30 [1915]. 846).

But Ladies none they were, albee in face
And outward shew faire semblance they did beare;
For vnder maske of beautie and good grace,
Vile treason and fowle falshood hidden were,
That mote to none but to the warie wise appeare.
(4. 1. 17)

In the false Florimel Spenser vividly pictures a woman who has no moral principle, whose apparent beauty has its source in mere physical qualities. An evil spirit invested with the false image of the true Florimel, she is created by a witch to quiet the lamentations of her son—a brutish churl—when the true Florimel escapes from him. After she delights the churl for a time, Braggadochio—a defamer and blustering pretender—snatches her away from him only to lose her to Ferraugh, who loses her to Blandamour,

whose fancie light
Was alwaies flitting as the wauering wind,
After each beautie, that appeard in sight,
. . . eftsoones it prickt his wanton mind
With sting of lust, that reasons eye did blind. (4. 2. 5)

Not a single noble-minded person is lured away by Florimel's beauty. What Spenser says concerning Blandamour in the lines just quoted is typical of all the false knights who are attracted by her. Blinded by their physical appetites, they are unable to detect her falseness.

When Paridel sees Blandamour, his make-believe friend, with the false Florimel, he

him enuied therefore,
As seeming plast in sole felicity:
So blind is lust, false colours to descry. (4. 2. 11)

Seeing her opportunity to stir up strife, Ate urges Paridel to attack Blandamour, which he does—all "for loue of *Florimell*" (4. 2. 22).

At the end of the three days' tournament at which the golden girdle—lost by the true Florimel on the seashore—is fought for, Satyrane, Triamond, and Britomart are declared the winners. In the beauty contest which follows, the snowy Florimel is judged the most beautiful and the girdle is awarded to her. Britomart being the final victor, the make-believe Florimel is given to her, but she

would not thereto assent,
Ne her owne *Amoret* forgoe so light
For that strange Dame, whose beauties wonderment
She lesse esteem'd, then th'others vertuous gouernment.
(4. 5. 20)

Although "forged things do fairest shew" (4. 5. 15), Britomart, since her whole nature is governed by the rational principle of the soul, is able to detect the falseness of the make-believe Florimel and therefore refuses her. Amoret,

Whose face discouered, plainely did expresse
The heauenly pourtraict of bright Angels hew, (4. 5. 13)

she is enamoured of, but false beauty makes no appeal to her.

When Britomart refuses Florimel, it is decided that she shall fall to Triamond, who, like Britomart, since his whole nature is under the control of reason, detects her falseness and will have nothing to do with her. His heart being pure, his loyalties are inviolable: he "lou'd *Canacee*, and other none" (4. 5. 21).

Florimel is now adjudged Satyrane's, who accepts her gladly. Whereupon much bickering and ill feeling arise: Blandamour and Paridel become jealous and begin to complain; Paridel, stirred by Ate "new discord to maintaine" (4. 5. 22), challenges Satyrane to single combat for Florimel; other lustful knights, including Braggadochio, all urged on by Ate, step forth, each one claiming Florimel as his paramour and vowing to maintain his contention with spear and shield. These base-minded knights are unable to distinguish between true and false beauty: "So blind is lust, false colours to descry" (4. 2. 11).[20]

In commenting on cantos four and five, in which all this strife over the make-believe Florimel is recounted, Professor Erskine says:

Giraldi had said that a false beauty often leads men into a false friendship, which cannot last. Though Britomart, Artegal, Cambel, Triamond and others in this tournament are examples of virtue,

[20] The same teaching is brought out in Spenser's comment on Duessa:

her forged beautie did seduce
The hearts of some, that fairest her did weene;
As diuerse wits affected diuers beene. (4. 5. 11)

discord spreads among them, and Scudamour is driven to the House of Care, all as a result of the untruth of the make-believe Florimel.[21]

That Spenser is writing under the influence of the Platonic tradition in regard to false beauty there is no doubt. Without question, also, the false Florimel promotes false friendship among the base-minded, to whom alone false beauty appeals. Discord, however, does not spread among " Britomart, Artegal, Cambel, Triamond and others in this tournament " who " are examples of virtue." This assertion is not in accord with Spenser's story; for, as has been shown, the false beauty of Florimel has no appeal for Britomart, or Triamond, or any other noble-minded person. It is true that discord spreads among Paridel, Blandamour, Braggadochio, and other lustful knights, but they are not " examples of virtue." It should be noted, moreover, that discord does not spread among even these sensuous-minded " all as a result of the untruth of the make-believe Florimel." Although she plays an important part in producing discord among them, she is the mere tool of Ate. Furthermore, in his desire to emphasize Florimel's influence, Professor Erskine goes too far when he says that " Scudamour is driven to the House of Care, all as a result of the untruth of the make-believe Florimel." This statement is not supported by Spenser's account. It is, he says, because

> The gentle *Scudamour*, whose hart whileare
> That stryfull hag [Ate] with gealous discontent
> Had fild, that he to fell reueng was fully bent.
>
> Bent to reuenge on blameless *Britomart*
> The crime, which cursed *Ate* kindled earst,
> The which like thornes did pricke his gealous hart.
> (4. 5. 30-31)

The story of Scudamour's being goaded to desperation by Ate and Duessa, who tell him that his love Amoret is faithless, is given earlier in the book (4. 1. 45-49). Through the machinations of these wicked hags, discord enters Scudamour's heart, causes him to become unfriendly to Britomart, and

[21] *Op. cit.*, p. 848.

finally results in his going to the House of Care.[22] Spenser nowhere suggests that "Scudamour is driven to the House of Care, all as a result of the untruth of the make-believe Florimel." In fact, the false Florimel's name is not even mentioned in this episode (4. 5. 30-46).

By way of contrast to the influence of the false beauty of the make-believe Florimel portrayed in canto five, Spenser gives in canto six a fine example of how true beauty promotes true friendship. In accordance with his practice of putting a crucial incident in the middle of each book, the sixth canto is pivotal. Exasperated because the knight of the Heben Spear (Britomart) defeated him at the recent tournament, Artegal, when he now by chance sees her riding by, attacks her. He is immediately thrown from his saddle, but continues to fight on foot. In a short time Britomart, too, is compelled to give up her horse. Evenly matched, they continue to fight until Artegal strikes off the front part of Britomart's helmet. Then, suddenly beholding her true beauty, he

> long gazing thereupon,
> At last fell humbly downe vpon his knee,
> And of his wonder made religion. (4. 6. 22)

When she

> with sharpe auizefull eye
> Beheld the louely face of *Artegall*,
> Tempred with sternesse and stout maiestie, (4. 6. 26)

she falls in love with him, and they become friends forever, joined with

> the band
> Of noble minds deriued from aboue,
> Which being knit with vertue, neuer will remoue.
> (4. 6. 31)

Thus, beauty effectively promotes friendship between Brito-

[22] Compare the following lines in regard to Scudamour's finding out that Amoret is not unfaithful to him:

> But *Scudamour* now woxen inly glad,
> That all his gealous feare he false had found,
> And how that Hag [Ate] his loue abused had
> With breach of faith and loyaltie vnsound,
> The which long time his grieued hart did wound.
> (4. 6. 28)

mart and Artegal.[23] Spenser's comment on their friendship in Book Three, when Britomart sees Artegal in Merlin's magic glass, corroborates this:

> Most sacred fire, that burnest mightily
> In liuing brests, ykindled first aboue,
> Emongst th' eternall spheres and lamping sky,
> And thence pourd into men, which men call Loue;
> Not that same, which doth base affections moue
> In brutish minds, and filthy lust inflame,
> But that sweet fit, that doth true beautie loue,
> And choseth vertue for his dearest Dame,
> Whence spring all noble deeds and neuer dying fame.
> (3. 3. 1)

When, in Book Five, the introduction of the make-believe Florimel has the crowd perplexed,

> So feeble skill of perfect things the vulgar has, (5. 3. 17)

the noble-minded Artegal, perceiving her falseness (5. 3. 22), steps forth and sets the two Florimels side by side, and all are amazed to see the false Florimel vanish into nothingness.[24]

Mr. H. C. Notcutt suggests an interpretation of the rôle of the make-believe Florimel squarely opposed to the one given here. He says:

> Spenser is showing us that Beauty, even when allied with Virtue, is not in itself a promoter of Friendship; while Beauty that conceals Vice is a powerful influence for destroying friendship.[25]

If the interpretation outlined in the present investigation is sound—and it seems to be borne out by every aspect of the story, Mr. Notcutt's is unsound. The pivotal sixth canto alone

[23] Cf. Pico della Mirandola, *A Platonick Discourse upon Love*, tr. by T. Stanley, ed. by E. G. Gardner (Boston, 1914), p. 29: "Beauty is the cause of Love"; Plato, *Republic* III, 402, Jowett, 3rd ed., 3. 89: "The man who has the spirit of harmony will be most in love with the loveliest; but he will not love him who is of an inharmonious soul"; Aristotle, *N. Eth.* 9. 5, Rackham, Loeb Classical Library, p. 539: "No one falls in love without first being charmed by beauty"; Giraldi, *Tre Dialoghi della Vita Civile*, prefixed to part 2 of the *Hecatommithi* (Venice, 1580), p. 81 (cited by Erskine, *op. cit.*, p. 843).

[24] Cf. Buoni, *op. cit.*, p. 40: "Corporall *Beauty* is restrained to a fewe collours of smale prise, which doe speedily vanish and decay"; also, the seventy-ninth sonnet of the *Amoretti*.

[25] "The *Faerie Queene* and Its Critics," *Essays and Studies* 12 (Oxford, 1926). 84.

shows that true beauty, when allied with virtue, promotes lasting friendship. Instead of showing that "Beauty that conceals Vice is a powerful influence for destroying friendship," Spenser shows that such beauty is not real beauty, that it appeals to the base-minded only, that friendship founded on such beauty will not last, and that true friendship is never jeopardized by it. Mr. Notcutt fails to see that in the allegory of the two Florimels Spenser's primary purpose is to distinguish between true beauty and false beauty and to show their respective power and influence.

The important incidents in which the make-believe Florimel plays a part have now been pointed out. The significant elements in the allegory are:

1. False beauty appeals to the base-minded and often promotes the semblance of friendship among such; but friendship founded on false beauty is mere make-believe and will not last.

2. A noble-minded person—a person whose whole nature is governed by reason—can distinguish between true and false beauty, and false beauty consequently has no real appeal for such a person. Hence, friendship among the noble-minded cannot be destroyed through the influence of false beauty.

3. True beauty promotes true friendship. In the Fourth Book, therefore, Spenser's Platonism is organically related to his theory of friendship: Venus is the source of concord because she is at once "The Queene of beautie, and of loue the mother" (4. 10. 29).

The make-believe Florimel is false beauty—beauty which does not have its source in a beautiful soul:

> Beautie is not, as fond men misdeeme,
> An outward shew of things, that onely seeme.
> (*HHB* ll. 90-91)

The evidence in this chapter is presented not as affording a complete explanation of the allegory of the two Florimels, but as demonstrating strikingly the degree to which certain Neo-Platonic concepts permeate Spenser's poetry. The allegory of the two Florimels, as interpreted here, furnishes a touchstone for Spenser's attitude toward true and false beauty in the entire *Faerie Queene*. Examination of the conception of

beauty informing the episodes in which such characters as Una, Belphoebe, Amoret, and Britomart play a part reveals that the theory of beauty exemplified there is consistent with the material submitted in this discussion. That true loveliness in woman is celestial is a constantly recurring theme in Spenser. His knights who embody the virtues without exception admire in women what he conceived to be true beauty. He never forgets that his purpose is " to fashion a gentleman or noble person in vertuous and gentle discipline."

V

IDEAS ABOUT FRIENDSHIP IN SPENSER AND ALAIN

The Fourth Book of Spenser's *Faerie Queene* and Alain's *The Complaint of Nature* have distinctive elements in common.[1] According to Alain's "theory of the art of love," God appointed Nature, to be assisted by Venus, as a "sort of deputy" to keep all things mundane bound together with "the golden chain of love."[2] He calls Nature the

> offspring of God, mother of all things, bond and firm chain of the universe, jewel of earth, mirror to mortality, light-bringer of the world! Peace, love, virtue, government, power, order, law, end, way, light, source, life, glory, splendor, beauty, form, pattern of the world! . . . who, guiding the universe with thy reins, dost join all things in firmness with the knot of concord, and dost with the bond of peace marry heaven to earth.[3]
>
> God added to this worldly palace various kinds of things, and these, though separated by the strife of different natures, He governed with harmony of proper order, furnished with laws, and bound with ordinances. And thus He united . . . things antagonistic . . . and . . . changed the strife of hatred into the peace of friendship. All things, then, agreeing through invisible bonds of union, plurality returned to unity, diversity to identity, dissonance to harmony, discord to concord in peaceful agreement.[4]

This conception of Nature as a harmonizing and unifying force in all aspects of human relations is strikingly analogous to Spenser's conception of Venus (*F. Q.* 4. 10. 44-47),[5] symbolized in Lady Concord and pictured throughout the Fourth Book. Compare Spenser's choruslike passage concerning Concord (*F. Q.* 4. 10. 34-35):

[1] If the primary conception in Spenser's *Mutabilitie* is closely analogous to that in the Fourth Book of the *Faerie Queene* (see pp. 7-14 above), and if Alain's *The Complaint of Nature* influenced *Mutabilitie* (Greenlaw, "Some Old Religious Cults in Spenser," *SP* 20 (1923). 216-243), hypothetically there should be some resemblance between the Fourth Book and *The Complaint of Nature.*

[2] *The Complaint of Nature,* tr. Douglas M. Moffat, *Yale Studies in English* (New York, 1908), pp. 44-45, 49, 90.

[3] *Ibid.,* pp. 32-33; cf. pp. 5-17.

[4] *Ibid.,* p. 43.

[5] Also, Alain's description of Nature, like that in *Mutabilitie,* is charged with the type of mysticism which pervades Spenser's account of Venus in the Fourth Book: cf. *F. Q.* 4. 10. 44-47 with Alain, *op. cit.,* p. 5 ff; see also p. 8 above.

> Concord she cleeped was in common reed,
> Mother of blessed *Peace*, and *Friendship* trew;
> . . . . . .
> By her the heauen is in his course contained,
> And all the world in state vnmoued stands,
> As their Almightie maker first ordained,
> And bound them with inuiolable bands.

Concord, like Nature in Alain, tempers opposites and forces them to join hands in the bonds of peace (*F. Q.* 4. 10. 32-33).

There are other noteworthy elements in the Fourth Book found also in *The Complaint of Nature*. According to Alain, it is by Nature that " the sea is joined closely to the earth by the firm bonds of friendship "; [6] according to Spenser's account of the marriage of the Thames and the Medway and the union of Marinel and Florimel, Concord performs a like function.[7] Alain says " the connection of pure love links us " and

> harmonizes our minds in firm peace, that not only is that union clothed in the express image of union, but even puts aside mere outward unity and tends towards the essence of identity.[8]

In the Fourth Book this unifying power of love is stressed as basic:

> These three did loue each other dearely well,
> And with so firme affection were allyde,
> As if but one soule in them all did dwell.[9]
> (*F. Q.* 4. 2. 43)

Alain says " no one . . . can except himself from the comprehensiveness of the power of love." [10] Spenser's Marinel tried it only to fail.[11] The indictment brought by Alain that " society is ruined and destroyed by the monster of sensual love," [12] that man alone " perverts the rules of love by . . . distorted

[6] *Op. cit.*, p. 35.
[7] See p. 7 above.
[8] *Op. cit.*, p. 89.
[9] Cf. Todd, *Works of Edmund Spenser*, London, 1805, 5. 192: "This is the moral and allegory of the fable, thus covertly mentioned by our poet according to his manner. There is but *one soul* in true love and friendship." Cf. pp. 37-42 above.
[10] *Op. cit.*, p. 45.
[11] *F.Q.* Books III and IV. Cf. Padelford, "The Women in Spenser's Allegory of Love," *JEGP* 16 (1917). 80; also, pp. 57-60 above.
[12] *Op. cit.*, p. 8.

passion,"[13] is essentially Spenser's point of view:[14] friendship obtains throughout the world except among human beings, where lust operates against it. The choruslike mutability passage in the eighth canto (*F. Q.* 4, 8. 30-33) and the prologue to Book Five alone make this evident. In the Fourth Book of the *Faerie Queene* there is, therefore, a salient element found in Alain not used in *Mutabilitie*;[15] namely, a portrayal of the warfare of sensual love on concord in the world of man. Mutabilitie and the Fourth Book are thus complemental:[16] in the one, there is primarily an exposition of order in the universe; in the other, primarily an exposition of order in the world of man.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 36.
[14] See pp. 1-14 above.
[15] See *SP* 20 (1923). 216-243.
[16] See pp. 7-14 above.

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VITA

Charles G. Smith was born at Siler City, North Carolina on June 6, 1891. He entered Wake Forest College in 1909 and was graduated B. A. in June, 1913. He was awarded the M. A. degree by the University of Pennsylvania in 1920, and by the University of North Carolina in 1921. From 1922 to 1925 he was instructor in English in Baylor University; in 1927-1928, in Goucher College. On September 9, 1926, he was married to Cornelia Marschall of Llano, Texas. Johns Hopkins University awarded him the Ph. D. degree in 1930. From 1928 to 1935 he was Professor of English in Baylor University. In 1935 he went to John B. Stetson University as Head of the Department of English.